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IMPROVING SHAREHOLDER MONITORING OF
CORPORATE MANAGEMENT BY EXPANDING
STATUTORY ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Randall S. Thomas*
I. INTRODUCTION
A central issue in contemporary corporate law is the effectiveness of
shareholders as monitors of corporate management.' For example, in a series
of recent articles, legal scholars have debated whether the rapid growth in the
equity ownership positions of institutional investors, the relative stability of
their shareholdings in each company, and their increased activism in corporate
governance matters, will lead to better monitoring by shareholders and
improved corporate performance.2 However, two predicates to effective
shareholder monitoring are that dispersed investors have information about the
companies they invest in and that they can communicate this information to
other investors so that they can act collectively.
Good monitors need cheap and easy access to information and
unimpeded, inexpensive methods of communicating to other shareholders.
Investors can learn much at a low cost through informal mechanisms, such as
meetings between managers and shareholders, or from examining public
documents filed by reporting companies under the federal securities laws. 3
These investors can also establish their own internal communication networks,
* Professor of Law, The University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., 1970, Haverford
College; Ph.D., 1983, University of Michigan; J.D., 1985, University of Michigan Law
School. The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Vice-Chancellor Jack B. Jacobs and
Professor Elliot J. Weiss, and the research assistance of Jay Byers.
1. One recent collection of important articles on this topic is the Cardozo Law Review's
symposium on institutional investors including articles by John Coffee, Edward Rock and Ian
Ayres. See generally Symposium, Taking Stock: Reflections on Sixty Years of Securities
Regulation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994).
2. Advocates of the position that institutional investor monitoring will lead to improved
corporate performance include Bernard S. Black, and Ronald J. Gilson and Reinier Kraakman.
See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); and Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). For
more skeptical views, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991); Edward B. Rock, Controlling
the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 987 (1994).
3. Shareholders can obtain information about some of the company's shareholders from
public filings, such as the institutional shareholders' Form 13F filings. Bernard S. Black,
Disclosure, Not Censorship, 17 J. CORP. L. 49, 68 (1991) [hereinafter Black, Disclosure, Not
Censorship]. However, these filings are limited to those institutions with over $100 million in
stocks and are only filed on a quarterly basis. Id. They can also obtain a significant amount of
information about registered companies from their Form 10-K and Form 10-Q filings.
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. L. Rev.  331 1996
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
as institutional investors have through organizations such as the Council of
Institutional Investors.4
When management is hostile to the ideas that the shareholders are
proposing, however, they can cut off their access to certain information. For
example, suppose management opposes an acquisition offer, or a bid for board
representation by a shareholder, such as Robert Monks' attempt to gain a seat
on Sears' board of directors. 5 In this situation, a corporation can refuse to give
shareholders access to key information, as Sears did to Monks when it refused
to provide him with a list of the names of other shareholders so that he could
solicit their votes. 6 Alternatively, management may not want shareholders to
learn about corporate mismanagement or wrongdoing and may withhold vital
data on these activities. 7 If management fails, or refuses, to provide them with
information, shareholders must rely on other mechanisms to get it.
This article analyzes shareholders' use of state corporate law inspection
statutes as a means of prying information out of corporations. Inspection
statutes permit shareholders to obtain two types of information from
recalcitrant managers: the corporation's stocklist and its books and records. The
stocklist gives the names and addresses of all of the corporation's current
shareholders; information vital for effective intra-shareholder communications
in critical situations.8 These communications are necessary for a shareholder
4. The Council of Institutional Investors is an organization that serves primarily as an
information clearinghouse for institutional investors, Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional
Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97, 157 (1988), although in
recent years it has also become an umbrella organization for institutions that are interested in
expanding shareholder voice. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 520, 569 (1990).
5. Robert A. G. Monks, My Run for the Sears Board, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 12, 1991,
at 20. A recent attempt by two labor unions to seat a representative on K-Mart Corporation's
board of directors over management's opposition is another example. Robert Berner, K-Mart
Urges Shareholders to Reject Proposals Filed by Two Labor Unions, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8,
1996, at A8.
6. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 68.
7. Although registered companies may have an obligation under the federal securities
laws to report some of this information to their shareholders, they may fail to do so or may do so
in a misleading manner. Furthermore, shareholders of companies that are not required to make
these disclosures have no alternative method in many cases of obtaining this information.
8. For example, in a proxy contest, the stocklist is essential for mailing the solicitation
materials to the shareholders once it has been decided to undertake the contest. But a stocklist
now consists of much more than just a list of record shareholders with their names and
addresses. Subsidiary information, such as magnetic tape compilations, breakdowns of
stockholding by depository nominees, commonly referred to as CEDE breakdowns, and (where
appropriate) lists of non-objecting beneficial owners of stock held by registered brokers and
dealers that are available to the issuer under Rule 14b-l(c) (the "NOBO list"), and its counterpart
for banks under Rule 14b-2 that hold stock for consenting beneficial owners (the "COBO list")
are now considered part of the stocklist. Daily transfer sheets from the date of the list provided to
the opposition shareholders, showing changes in the holdings of shareholders, will be needed
up to the date of the meeting.
A CEDE breakdown is a list provided by the depository trusts of the brokers, banks and
other institutions who have the company's securities registered under the name of the
depositories' nominee. This information is critical for communicating with the beneficial holders
of the company's stock.
In response to a stockholder's demand for a stocklist, a court will order the production of
a CEDE breakdown if the corporation does not have one already prepared. Shamrock Assoc. v.
Texas Am. Energy Corp., 517 A.2d 658, 660-61 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Delaware court's
rationale has been that these lists can be prepared within hours by the depository trusts and
therefore should be considered to be in the company's possession. The CEDE breakdown
(Vol. 38:331332
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trying to convince other shareholders to vote for its proposal or hoping to
solicit support against a management proposal. 9
A shareholder seeking to uncover corporate mismanagement or fraud
may need access to the company's internal files.' 0 It can obtain access to the
corporation's books and records pursuant to a court order under an inspection
statute. These statutes could authorize a court to give a shareholder any
document that the corporation possesses, although typically courts limit this
access to corporate minutes and accounting records.l The Delaware Supreme
Court has suggested that shareholders could use these statutes to investigate
potential corporate wrongdoing before seeking to file derivative lawsuits.12
Shareholders seeking evidence of securities fraud necessary for filing a class
action under the new stricter pleadings requirements imposed by the Securities
Litigation Reform Act might also be interested in using corporate inspection
statutes.'
3
enables dissidents to send their materials directly to the banks and brokers for forwarding to the
ultimate beneficial owners.
However, the CEDE breakdown does not give a dissident stockholder the names and
addresses of the beneficial holders of the company's stock. To get this information, the
stockholder needs NOBO/COBO lists. NOBO/COBO lists are lists of the beneficial owners of a
corporation's stock whose stock is held in record-only form by brokers and who do not object to
the disclosure of NOBO's, or whose stock is held in record-only form by banks and who
affirmatively consent to the disclosure of COBO's, their name and address by their broker or
bank to the corporation itself for the limited purpose of facilitating direct communication on
corporate matters. The federal proxy rules require registered brokers, dealers and banks that hold
the company's stock in street name to compile NOBO or COBO lists at the corporation's
request. See SEC Rules 14a-13 and 14b-1, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-13 and 240.14b-1 (1993).
These lists must give the name, address and stock ownership of each nonobjecting, or
consenting, beneficial stockholder as of the date specified in the issuer's request, and must be
sent to the issuer no later than five business days after the record date or the date specified in the
issuer's request. The state courts have ordered corporations to turn over NOBO/COBO lists
where they are already in their possession but have split over whether a company that does not
have one must obtain one when a shareholder makes a demand. Compare, Cenergy Corp. v.
Bryson Oil & Gas, P.L.C., 662 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (D. Nev. 1987) (same); Parsons v.
Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 426 S.E.2d 685, 690-91 (N.C. 1993) (same); RB Assocs. v. Gilette
Co., No. 9711, 1988 WL 27731, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1988) (denying shareholder
request), with Sadler v. NCR Corp., 928 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1991) (ordering creation of
NOBO/COBO lists).
9. These stocklists are not public information; the shareholders can only obtain one
from management. If management is not willing provide this stocklist, the shareholder usually
must file suit in state court to force the stocklist's production. This litigation delays the
shareholder's efforts to communicate with other shareholders and costs them money, but it
remains the only sure way of obtaining the stocklist.
10. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that corporate frauds may only be
discoverable through the examination of corporate records by shareholders. Guthrie v.
Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 155 (1905).
11. The "books and records" of the corporation include appropriate corporate accounting
records, minutes of all meetings of the corporation's shareholders, the board of directors or its
committees, or of actions taken by written consent by the shareholders or board of directors, the
stocklist materials, and copies of the corporation's certificate of incorporation, bylaws, written
communications to shareholders and resolutions creating one or more classes of stock. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 16.01 (1991) [hereinafter MBCA]. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 224 (1993) (records include stocklist, books of account, and minute books).
12. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 n.10 (Del. 1993). See infra notes 143, 145-
47 and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
13. See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, Using State Inspection Statutes for
Discovery in Federal Securities Fraud Class Actions (Unpublished Working Paper, University
of Iowa College of Law 1996) (copy on file with author).
1996] 333
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Shareholders' inspection rights are qualified by the recognition that the
corporation has a competing interest to be free from harassment by dissident
investors. 14 Shareholders seeking to disrupt the corporation's business, or
misuse its proprietary information, cannot be allowed unrestrained access to
corporate secrets.' 5 The corporation's management must balance the interests of
all shareholders against those of the shareholder seeking to obtain the corporate
information.
State inspection statutes attempt to protect the corporation from abusive
demands by requiring that shareholders make their demands in good faith and
that they state a proper purpose for seeking to obtain the information.' 6 The
stockholder has no right to an examination if her purpose is to satisfy her
curiosity, to annoy or harass the corporation with litigation, to attempt to force
the corporation to buy out her interest, or to accomplish some object hostile to
the corporation or detrimental to its interests.' 7 Proper purposes have generally
been defined as including those purposes reasonably related to the stockholder's
interest as a stockholder, that is, they must benefit the stockholder in her status
as a stockholder.' 8
Scholars have yet to examine whether inspection statutes provide
shareholders effective access to the information that they need to monitor
managers without sacrificing the interests of the corporation.' 9 This article uses
an empirical analysis of cases filed under the most important of the state
inspection statutes, the Delaware statute, to examine whether inspection statutes
facilitate shareholder communication and information collection.
This analysis shows that the Delaware inspection statute is a time
consuming, expensive, but generally successful way for shareholders to obtain
information about their corporation. For example, shareholders using the
Delaware stocklist statute are able to obtain a stockiist in about seventy-eight
14. James L. Young, Texas Law on Stockholders' Inspection Rights: How Does it Stack
up Against Delaware Law and the Model Business Corporation Act?, 40 SW. L.J. 845, 845-46
(1986).
15. See 2 ERNEST L. FOLK, III, ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW, § 220.5 (1993).
16. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1993). The Delaware statute provides that
the stockholder must make demand under oath stating a proper purpose for requesting the
information. Under the terms of the statute, a proper purpose is defined as a purpose related to
the stockholder's interest in the corporation.
17. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.7.4. Other improper purposes include seeking
a stocklist to satisfy potential future needs, obtaining a list for resale to third parties, or getting
the list as part of a fishing expedition.
18. In this regard, the courts have held that it is a proper purpose to ask to inspect the
stock books in order to communicate with fellow shareholders and solicit proxies in opposition
to the management, even if the stockholder's role is limited to supporting the contest and
supplying the list to someone else, whether in connection with a proxy contest, a tender offer, or
otherwise. 2 id. § 220.7.3. Some other examples of proper purposes include the investigation of
suspected mismanagement or of the corporation's financial condition, determination of the value
of one's stock, opposition to corporate plans, dissemination of information concerning a
proposed merger or to aid the stockholder in ongoing litigation by inviting other shareholders to
join in it. 2 id.
19. Similar issues under the federal proxy rules have been highlighted in the recent
debate over proxy reform. See, e.g., Symposium, Proxy Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. 1 (1991);
Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Black,
Next Steps]; John C. Coffee, The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 837 (1994).
334 [Vol. 38:331
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. L. Rev.  334 1996
IMPROVING SHAREHOLDER MONITORING
percent of the cases examined.20 The median successful stocklist plaintiffs spend
over a month in litigation, while unsuccessful plaintiffs wait significantly
longer.21 All plaintiffs pay significant attorneys' fees to litigate these cases.
Shareholders get books and records in only slightly more than two-thirds
of the inspection cases examined.22 Successful plaintiffs' median wait exceeds
three months, while unsuccessful shareholders spend over eight months in
litigation.23 Once again, shareholders incur substantial attorneys' fees to get this
information.
This article argues that for the Delaware inspection statute to facilitate
effective shareholder monitoring, it must be significantly streamlined. The
article considers a variety of possible reforms to the existing statute, such as
shortening the discovery, trial and appeal processes, granting shareholders
automatic access to stocklists, increasing sanctions for frivolous refusals to
produce information, and attorney fee shifting provisions. This article finds
that, while each of the suggested reforms would increase shareholder access to
corporate information, safeguards must be kept in place to insure against abuses
by unscrupulous opportunists. These safeguards are more easily implemented
for stocklists than for certain types of books and records because of the highly
sensitive nature of some internal corporate materials.
The article also addresses two related issues concerning inspection
statutes: first, the proposed strengthening of the federal stocklist regulations
which could potentially supplant the state law remedy; and second, the potential
use of inspection statutes as a discovery device by shareholders to investigate
corporate wrongdoing prior to filing a derivative or class action. It concludes
that the SEC should amend Rule 14a-7 to provide shareholders better access to
stocklists if state law is not revised. It further concludes that many plaintiffs in
potential derivative and class action lawsuits are unlikely to use the Delaware
inspection statute to uncover corporate wrongdoing unless there are significant
changes made to its present form.
The article proceeds as' follows. Section II traces the historical
development of shareholder inspection rights from their traditional common
law forms through their statutory codification. Section III focuses on the
background of the Delaware inspection statute and its important features.
Section IV presents empirical data concerning the effectiveness of the Delaware
statute. It then discusses the implications of these results for the two issues
mentioned above: whether the federal stocklist rules need to be strengthened
and the use of the inspection statute as a discovery device. Section V looks at
several possible changes to the Delaware inspection statute to determine if they
would improve shareholders' access to information. The concluding section
recommends that existing inspection statutes be revised to provide easier access
for shareholders to stocklists and corporate books and records.
II. THE HISTORY OF SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS
Inspection rights have developed from two overlapping sources: a
20. See Table 1, infra at page 350, and text accompanying notes 114-17.
2 1. See Table 1, infra at page 350, and text accompanying notes 120-22.
22. See Table 3, infra at page 352, and text accompanying notes 132-34.
23. See Table 3, infra at page 352, and text accompanying note 134.
1996] 335
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. L. Rev.  335 1996
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
shareholder's property right in the corporation and the agency relationship that
exists between shareholders and the corporation's management.24 From the
property right perspective, shareholders are entitled to inspect corporate books
and records to obtain information to protect their economic interest in the
corporation. 25 Inspection rights are based on the shareholders' underlying
ownership of the corporation's assets and property, even though legal title to
the assets and property is vested in the corporation.26
Inspection rights are also grounded in the agency relationship between
shareholders and managers of the corporation: shareholders have a right to
inform themselves about how their agents are performing their duties.27 The
shareholders must have a means of examining the books and records under the
control of the officers and other agents.28 Under either perspective, inspection
statutes should provide shareholders with a quick and inexpensive method of
obtaining the information that they need to keep tabs on management and to
communicate with other shareholders.
A. The Common Law Origins of Shareholders' Inspection Rights
Before the seventeenth century, the corporation was regarded strictly as a
24. While these two interests are conceptually distinct, they overlap to such a great extent
that the courts have frequently treated them together. See, e.g., Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663
A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995) ("[I]nspection rights have been viewed as an incident to the
stockholder's ownership of corporate property....As a matter of self-protection, the stockholder
was entitled to know how his agents were conducting the affairs of the corporation of which he
or she was a part owner.")
25. Samuel M. Koenigsberg, Provisions in Corporate Charters and By-Laws Governing
the Inspection of Books by Stockholders, 30 GEO. L.J. 227, 227-28 (1942); Brian C. Griffin,
Note, Shareholder's Inspection Rights, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 616, 616 (1977); Note, Proper
Purpose for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DUKE L.J. 393, 394 [hereinafter Note,
Proper Purpose].
26. The legal fiction that a corporation is separate from the shareholders does not obscure
the fact that the shareholders are the true owners. Graciano C. Regala, Nature of the Rights of
Stockholders to Examine the Books of the Corporation, 21 PHIL. L.J. 74, 75 (1941). The
shareholder is recognized as an equitable owner of the corporate assets through his title to the
stock. RUSSELL B. STEVENSON, JR., CORPORATIONS AND INFORMATION: SECRECY,
ACCESS, AND DISCLOSURE 152 (1980); Susan B. Hoffnagle & Jolyan A. Butler, Shareholders'
Right to Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 4 CONN. L. REV. 707, 709 (1972); 18 C.J.S.
Corporations § 502 (1939). The shareholder's right to inspection is acknowledged as one of the
rights incident to ownership in order to protect her proprietary interest and to insure the honest
and diligent performance of those to whom she has entrusted to manage her investment.
Hoffnagle & Butler, supra, at 709. A shareholder has a fundamental right to be intelligently
informed about corporate matters. 5A WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF
THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATION § 2213 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1987). However, the United
States Supreme Court has stated that a shareholder's right to inspect corporate books and recordsis not a right which universally attaches to corporate shares. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S.
332, 343-44 (1967); see 5A FLETCHER, supra, § 2213.
27. Common law inspection rights stem from the proposition that corporate officers are
merely the agents, or trustees, of the real owners of the property, the shareholders.
Koenigsberg, supra note 25, at 227; Griffin, Note, supra note 25, at 616; Note, Proper
Purpose, supra note 25, at 394. The United States Supreme Court endorsed this position in
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1905) ("The right of inspection rests upon the
proposition that those in charge of the corporation are merely the agents of the stockholders who
are the real owners of the property."); 5A FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 2213; Regala, supra note
26, at 75.
28. Without shareholder inspection rights, those in charge of a corporation potentially
may engage in gross incompetence or dishonesty for years. HENRY W. BALLANTINE,
BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 159 (rev. ed. 1946); 5A FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 2213.
336 [Vol. 38:331
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trustee holding its property for the benefit of the stockholders. 29 As the modem
corporation developed during the industrial revolution, the English common
law began to recognize a shareholder's right to inspect the books of the
corporation in order to protect his property interests.30
In the early 1700's, the English courts granted shareholders access to
corporate books and records.3' The rule was well-stated by the court in Rex v.
Fraternity of Hostman: "every member of the corporation had, as such, a right
to look into the books for any matter that concerned himself, though it was in a
dispute with others."32 The court went on to hold that
such books .... as are the common property of aggregate bodies
acknowledged as such by our law, in which every member has an
interest as being the evidence of some property or franchise being
vested in him, or of his having conducted himself in the exercise of that
franchise correctly. Such are corporation books with respect to
corporators. 33
Today, the general rule at common law is that all stockholders of a
private corporation have the right to inspect and examine the books and records
of the corporation. 34 The common law right is not an absolute right, however,
but rather a qualified one exercised only where the shareholder has established
a proper purpose and proper time and place for inspection. 35 A proper purpose
under common law has been defined as "a purpose relating to the interest that
the stockholder sought to protect by seeking inspection." 36 As the Delaware
29. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO AMERICAN LAw 382-83 (2d ed.
1932).
30. In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (N.Y. 1899).
3 1. For example, the court in Gery v. Hopkins stated that "there is great reason for it, for
they are books of a public company, and kept for public transactions, in which the public are
concerned; and the books are the title of the buyers of stocks, by Act of Parliament." Gery v.
Hopkins, 87 Eng. Rep. 1142 (1702).
32. Rex v. Fraternity of Hostman, 93 Eng. Rep. 1144 (1745).
33. Id. In another case, Richards v. Pattinson, the court granted an elector of a
corporation the right to inspect the "part of the corporation-books where the names of the
freemen are inrolled, and make copies at his own expense." Richards v. Pattinson, 94 Eng. Rep.
893 (1737).
In the 1790 case of Rex v. Babb, Lord Kenyon assumed "that in certain cases the
members of a corporation may be permitted to inspect all papers relating to the corporation." Rex
v. Babb, 100 Eng. Rep. 743, 744 (1790); see also Rex v. Merchant Tailors' Co., 109 Eng.
Rep. 1086, 1089 (1831); Young v. Lynch, 96 Eng. Rep. 14 (1747). In Rex v. Babb, the court
held that if a corporator has a general right of inspection, he may apply at any time, and not wait
until there is a cause in the court before he makes that the ground of his application. If a
shareholder applies for a general inspection of all papers merely on the ground of his having an
interest in them as a member of the corporation, he must shape his application accordingly.
Babb, 100 Eng. Rep. at 744-45; see also Merchant Tailors' Co., 109 Eng. Rep. at 1089.
34. Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 154 (1905); Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663
A.2d 464, 466 (Del. 1995); 5A FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 2214; HARRY G. HENN & JOHN
R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS § 199 (1987). See also BALLANTINE, supra note
28, §§ 159, 160; GEORGE D. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 611, 612
(1959); Frank G. Newman, Inspection of Stock Ledgers and Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439,
440 (1962); Regala, supra note 26, at 75; 18A AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 348 (1985); 18
C.J.S. Corporations § 332 (1990); Annotation, Stockholder's Right to Inspect Books and
Records of Corporation, 22 A.L.R. 24 (1923), supplemented in 43 A.L.R. 783 (1926), 59
A.L.R. 1373 (1929), 80 A.L.R. 1502 (1932), 174 A.L.R. 262 (1948); W.E. Shipley,
Annotation, Purposes for Which Stockholder or Officer May Exercise Right to Examine
Corporate Books and Records, 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951).
35. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 466-67; Hoffnagle & Butler, supra note 26, at 709.
3 6. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 467.
19961 337
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Supreme Court recently stated: "the propriety of a demanding stockholder's
purpose was measured by whether it related to the stockholder's interest qua
stockholder, that is, a proper purpose in seeking inspection was viewed as a
purpose germane to the petitioner's interest or status as a stockholder." 37
The common law form of the shareholder's right to inspection could be
exercised through a variety of judicial forms: mandamus at law; mandatory
injunction in equity; animation-before-trial; or discovery-and-inspection.8
B. The Development of Statutory Inspection Rights
In the 1800's, firms grew larger and more complex and their
shareholders became more numerous and dispersed. The shareholders' need for
reliable information concerning corporate affairs expanded with the
increasingly complicated problems of corporate finance and production, in
addition to the rapidly expanding number of shareholders. 39 Shareholders were
less and less likely to be involved in the corporation's management, or to have
easy access to inside information about the company's business. To learn about
what was happening to their investment they needed assistance to get this
information and they turned to statutory corporate law to get that help.40
Corporate law statutes in the early 1800's offered two approaches to deal
with this problem: (1) declaring a right for shareholders to inspect the books
and records of the corporation; and (2) requiring the corporation to make
periodic reports to its shareholders. Although states consistently failed to
impose effective reporting requirements through the nineteenth and mid-
twentieth centuries, state statutory law concerning shareholder inspection rights
was more favorable. 41
For many years, the courts interpreted these statutes to impose limitations
on a shareholder's inspection rights by requiring the shareholder to seek
inspection in good faith and for proper purposes. 42 A proper purpose was
defined in the same manner as under the common law right: a purpose that
related to the stockholder's interest in the corporation.43 These limitations
37. Id.
38. HORNSTEIN, supra note 34, § 611. Generally, shareholder inspection rights are fully
recognized in the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision. 5A FLETCHER, supra note
26, § 2214. Moreover, a shareholder is deprived of the common law right only by specific
statutory terms or by some authorized provision of the corporation's articles or charter or by
some valid and authorized bylaw. Id.
39. JAMES W. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1970, at 89 (1970).
40. HURST, supra note 39, at 89. See also Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 467 ("As an
equitable owner of the corporation's assets, a stockholder possessed a right to reasonable
information concerning the conduct of corporate management, as well as the condition of the
corporation's business and affairs.").
41. HURST, supra note 39, at 89-90.
42. Id. at 90; C. Thomas Attix, Jr., Note, Rights of Equitable Owners of Corporate
Shares, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 999, 1000 (1951) [hereinafter Attix, Note, Rights of Equitable
Owners]; George B. Davis, Note, Shareholder Inspection Rights, 12 SW. L.J. 61, 61 (1958);
see, e.g., State v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 88 A. 449, 452 (Del. Super. Ct. 1913) (stating
that a shareholder's right to inspection under Delaware law was conditional upon whether it was
sought in good faith and for a specific and proper purpose); In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105
(N.Y. 1899) (recognizing that shareholder inspection rights under New York law were limited to
a proper purpose under reasonable circumstances).
43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Thiele v. Cities Serv. Co., 115 A. 773, 776 (Del. 1922):
If it appears that [the stockholder] seeks to exercise the right for some purpose
[Vol. 38:331338
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invited contests and often resulted in lengthy and costly litigation.44
Over time the shareholders' statutory access to corporate information
became unfettered. 45 By the late 1800's, state legislatures commonly encoded
and extended the common law right of inspection in unqualified terms. 46 The
limitations of the common law rule, the good faith and proper purpose
requirements, were thought to be too restrictive. Thus the new statutes vested
an absolute right in shareholders to inspect corporate books and records
regardless of their purpose.47 By the early 1900's, many state statutes also
provided for punitive sanctions against a company and its officials for refusing
to provide the information requested by shareholders, even where the
shareholder's demands were clearly unreasonable.48
The legislatures' and courts' recognition of an unfettered right to inspect
books and records led to unfortunate consequences. For example, business
competitors would purchase shares of a company to obtain unfair access to
corporate information or to blackmail their competitors.49
These abuses resulted in a legislative backlash in the 1930's and a
statutory movement back toward the common law's limitations on shareholders'
inspection rights.50 Some states went beyond the common law rule to limit the
that is in no wise connected with his interest as a stockholder, but is entirely
foreign to such interest, the court which is asked to issue mandamus upon the
corporation to compel it to aid him in pursuing such a purpose, not only has the
right under the statute to deny him the writ, but it is its duty in the exercise of a
sound discretion to do so.
44. HURST, supra note 39, at 90.
45. Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22
WASH. U. L.Q. 305, 331 (1937).
46. HURST, supra note 39, at 90; Rutledge, supra note 45, at 331; Note, Proper
Purpose, supra note 25, at 395; Attix, Note, Rights of Equitable Owners, supra note 42, at
1000-01; Davis, Note, Shareholder Inspection Rights, supra note 42, at 61; see, e.g., CODES
AND STAT. OF CAL. § 5321 (1876) (requiring "[elvery corporation...keep... in a place
accessible to the shareholders, and for their use... a book containing a list of all
stockholders...."); N.Y. LAW ch. 564, § 29 (1890) (stating that the corporate books and stock
ledger "shall daily, during business hours, be open for the inspection of shareholders..."); OHIO
REV. STAT. § 3254 (1892) (maintaining that the "books and records of such corporation shall at
all reasonable times, be open to the inspection of every stockholder").
47. Rutledge, supra note 45, at 331; Attix, Note, Rights of Equitable Owners, supra note
42, at 1000-01; Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 395; see, e.g., Furst v. Rawleigh
Medical Co., 118 N.E. 763, 765 (Ill. 1918) (stating that the shareholder inspection rights
conferred by Illinois statutory law were "unqualified and unrestricted, except, only, for the
limitation that the right shall be exercised at reasonable times"); Henry v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 89 N.E. 942, 943 (N.Y. 1909) (recognizing a shareholder's absolute right of inspection
and imposing an absolute duty upon the corporation to provide information under New York
statutory law).
48. Rutledge, supra note 45, at 331. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 4551 (1929)
(imposing a $250 fine on officers.in charge of corporate books for refusal or neglect to grant
inspection rights to shareholders); N.Y. LAW ch. 127, § 32 (1916) (imposing a $50 fine on any
corporate officer who wilfully neglected to allow the inspection of books and records).
49. Rutledge, supra note 45, at 331.
50. Id.; Davis, Note, Shareholder Inspection Rights, supra note 42, at 61; see, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 355 (Deering 1931) (declaring that "[t]he share register, the book of
accounts, and minutes of proceedings...shall be open to inspection upon the written demand of
any.. .stockholder... at any reasonable time, and for a purpose reasonably related to his interests
as a shareholder..."); 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 300, § 33 (stating that "[e]very shareholder shall
have a right to examine... for any proper purpose.. .the share register, books of accounts and
records..."); N.Y. LAW, ch. 641, § 10 (1933) (limiting shareholder inspection rights so "that
such inspection shall not be for the purpose of communicating with stockholders in the interest
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category of shareholders who were entitled to inspection rights, including the
restrictions that a shareholder seeking inspection of corporate books and
records must own a certain percentage of outstanding stock and must own that
stock for a required minimum length of time prior to seeking inspection.51
Today, shareholders' qualified rights to obtain a stockist and inspect
corporate books and records are accepted in every state.52 The substance of the
Model Business Corporation Act's ("MBCA") statutory provisions are typical
of those used in many states. The MBCA contains provisions defining corporate
records, the inspection rights of shareholders and the scope of those rights, and
the procedures for court-ordered inspection.53
The MBCA grants any shareholder the right to examine the books and
records of the corporation upon written demand at reasonable times for a
proper purpose. 54 A proper purpose is defined as a purpose that is "reasonably
relevant to the demanding shareholder's interest as a shareholder." 55 If the
corporation refuses the shareholder's demand, the shareholder may apply to a
court for an order compelling the production of the needed books and
records.56 If the court orders production, the corporation must prove its refusal
was in good faith, or it must pay the shareholder's attorneys' fees and costs of
filing the suit. This statute supplements but does not supplant the shareholder's
common law inspection rights.57
III. THE DELAWARE INSPECTION STATUTE
Delaware is the preeminent state corporate law jurisdiction in the United
States.58 Its corporate code is applied by lawyers throughout the nation in
deciding how to structure complex transactions. The Delaware Chancery Court
decides most of the important American corporate law cases, whether they arise
out of hostile acquisitions or disputes over access to stocklists and corporate
books and records. Delaware corporate jurisprudence is therefore widely
followed by other states' courts.
However, at the turn of twentieth century, New Jersey, not Delaware,
of a business or object other than the business of the corporation"); see also Davids v. Sillcox,
66 N.Y.S.2d 508, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946) (recognizing that the proper purpose requirement
under New York law included the limitations and safeguards necessary to deny judicial
consideration for "[t]he blackmailer, the scandalmonger, the irresponsible busybody and trouble
maker, the professed seeker of information which is really intended to be used for some ulterior
purpose").
51. Rutledge, supra note 45, at 331-32; see, e.g., LA. GEN. STAT. § 1118 (1932)(compelling ownership of at least two percent of the outstanding stock for at least six months);
1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 327, § 45 (requiring shareholders seeking inspection to own at least two
percent of the outstanding capital stock for at least three months prior thereto); N.Y. LAW ch.
641, § 10 (1933) (requiring stockholders seeking inspection to be either stockholders of record
for at least six months immediately preceding demand or to be owners of at least five percent of
all outstanding shares of the corporation).
5 2. 5A FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 2213.
53. MBCA §§ 16.01-16.04.
54. Id. § 16.02. Many states restrict this right to shareholders that have held their stock
for a stated period of time, usually six months, or who hold more than a specified percentage,
usually five percent, of the corporation's stock.
55. Id § 16.02(c), Offical Commentary, at 1721.
56. Id. § 16.04.
57. Id. § 16.02, Official Commentary, at 1723.
5 8. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 42 (1993).
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dominated the corporate charter market.59 In seeking to compete in the market
for corporation charters, Delaware copied the New Jersey Revised Statute of
1896 essentially verbatim in 1899.60 This included the New Jersey code's
statutory inspection rights.
A. Shareholder Inspection Rights in Delaware Prior to 1967
On March 10, 1899, the Delaware legislature adopted section 17 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law, the predecessor of the modem Delaware
statute. The statute included the following provision codifying shareholders'
right to inspect the corporate stock ledger, or stocklist:
The original or duplicate stock ledger containing the names and
addresses of the stockholders, and the number of shares held by them,
respectively, shall, at all times, during the usual hours of business, be
open to the examination of every stockholder at its principal office or
place of business in this State, and said original or duplicate stock ledger
shall be evidence in all courts of this State.61
Although the statutory provisions governing shareholders' inspection
rights under the Delaware General Corporation Law were amended several
times over the next fifty years, the language of this provision remained
virtually untouched until the 1967 revisions of the code.62
59. Id.
60. CHRISTOPHER GRANDY, NEw JERSEY AND THE FISCAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CORPORATION 76 (1993).
61. 21 Del. Laws ch. 273, § 17(1899).
62. The statute was amended numerous times over the next 70 years. Section 17 was
amended and approved as § 29 of the General Corporation Law of Delaware on March 7, 1901.
The shareholders' right to inspect stock ledgers embodied in the 1899 version remained
unchanged in the revised version. 22 Del. Laws ch. 167, § 29 (1901). The courts interpreted
this statute to authorize shareholders to inspect the corporation's books and records, Shaw v.
Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995), although this was not expressly provided for
in the statutory language until the 1967 revision of the Delaware code. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 220 (1967). Furthermore, the 1901 amendment to § 29 included a provision permitting a
corporation to grant bondholders the same rights as shareholders, including the right to inspect
corporate books and records. 22 Del. Laws ch. 167, § 29 (1901). Although § 29 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law was modified again in 1903, 1927, and 1929, the provision
that embodied shareholder inspection rights remained unaltered. 22 Del. Laws ch. 394, § 29(1903); 35 Del. Laws ch. 85, § 13 (1927); 36 Del. Laws ch. 135, § 15 (1929).
In 1949, the 115th General Assembly of Delaware created the Revised Code
Commission to prepare a revised code of the general statutes of Delaware. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
2, at ix (1953) (Report of the Revised Code Commission); 47 Del. Laws ch. 377 (1949). The
governor of Delaware, Elbert N. Carvel, appointed S. Samuel Arsht, Henry J. Ridgely, and
James M. Tunnell, Jr. to comprise the Revised Code Commission. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, at ix
(1953) (Report of the Revised Code Commission). In 1951, the Commission contracted with
West Publishing Company of St. Paul, Minnesota, and Edward Thomas Company of Brooklyn,
New York to prepare the revisions under the supervision of the Commission, and to print and
publish the proposed Code in the revised form. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, at xi (1953).
In 1953, the Delaware legislature enacted and the governor approved the new Delaware
Code, the first completely modem and annotated edition of the general statutory laws in multiple
volumes. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, at v (1953) (publisher's preface). The new Code differed
radically from all of the previous Delaware codes in the arrangement of subject matter and style
of presentation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 2, at xi (1953) (Report of the Revised Code Commission).
The provisions containing the shareholder's right to inspect the stocklist as originally
passed in 1899 remained essentially unaltered in § 220. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953).
Section 220 of the revised Code also contained the provision from the former statute stating that
the stock ledger is the only evidence as to determine the voting status of shareholders. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1953).
1996] 341
HeinOnline  -- 38 Ariz. L. Rev.  341 1996
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
Prior to the 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, the
Delaware Superior Court (not the Chancery Court) enforced shareholder
inspection rights through the mandamus petition. 63 Mandamus is:
the name of a writ.. .which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction,
and is directed to a private ... corporation, or any of its
officers.. .commanding the performance of a particular act therein
specified, and belonging to his or their public, official, or ministerial duty,
or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of
which he has been illegally deprived. 64
The pre-1967 practice of the Delaware courts in mandamus proceedings
required the stockholder, called the relator through petition, to state the facts
that established its legal right to the remedy sought.65 In its answer, the
defendant had to either show that it had obeyed the command of the writ or,
alternatively, deny the averments of the petition in showing the stockholder to
be without right to the remedy. 66 If these denials were not unequivocal,
complete and sufficient, the averments in the petition were held to be valid, and
a writ of mandamus was awarded to enforce the stockholder's rights.67
The Delaware courts interpreted the unqualified language of the statute to
create a right for shareholders to inspect the stocklist.68
Under the statute, the stockholder need only allege in the petition for a
writ of mandamus: (i) that the defendant company is a corporation; (ii)
that the petitioner is a stockholder of record therein; (iii) that there was a
proper demand and refusal of inspection; and (iv) that the corporation
failed to comply with a duty imposed by law sought to be enforced by
the proceeding. 69
Thus, in a petition to compel the inspection of the stocklist under the pre-
1967 version of section 220, the shareholder did not have to allege a proper
purpose in the petition, as required by common law.70 The corporation had the
burden of proving that the shareholder's purpose was improper, unlawful, or in
bad faith if it wanted to prevent the issuance of a writ to compel inspection of
63. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.2. See Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 468(enactment of § 220 replaced the "formalized and burdensome mandamus procedure in the
Superior Court.").
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (6th ed. 1990).
65. State ex rel. Nat'l Bank v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 88 A. 449, 451 (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1913).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 451-52. Under Delaware law, the writ of mandamus was not a writ of right,
but rather issued only when the facts of the case, within judicial discretion, showed that issuance
was justified. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books and Records in Delaware, 41 VA. L. REV.
237, 238 (1955) [hereinafter Note, Inspection of Corporate Books]. See State ex rel. Miller v.
Loft, Inc., 156 A. 170, 171-72 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931). Any interest seeking to be secured or
enforced by a writ of mandamus needed to "constitute a clear legal right existing in the relator at
the time of the application." State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 28 A.2d 148, 152 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1942). A writ of mandamus was not to be issued in doubtful cases, nor was one to
be issued to enforce a right found to be in substantial dispute or a right found to be inchoate. 28
A.2d at 152.
68. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 395-96 (discussing a shareholder's right to
inspect the stock ledger under § 220, but recognizing the limitations of the mandamus
proceedings).
69. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 467 (Del. 1995).
70. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396. See also Note, Inspection of Corporate
Books, supra note 67, at 239.
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the stocklist.71 Thus, the statutory burden of proof in an action to obtain a
stocklist was not nearly as strict as under the common law.72
Shareholders had both common law and statutory rights to obtain books
and records from a Delaware corporation under pre-1967 Delaware law.73 As
with the stocklist, a shareholder made an application to the Superior Court for a
writ of mandamus when an inspection of books or records had been sought and
denied.74 In a petition seeking mandamus to compel inspection of the books and
records under the pre-1967 Delaware law, a stockholder had to allege a specific
and proper purpose for the inspection.75 The proper purpose had to "be alleged
not by a mere bare general statement that is a proper one, but by the allegation
of specific facts, from which the propriety of such purpose will appear."76 The
71. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 239; see State ex reL Foster
v. Standard Oil Co., 18 A.2d 235, 237-38 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941).
72. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 239. Although the statute
eased the burden on the shareholder seeking inspection of the stocklist, mandamus proceedings
did not create an absolute right for the stockholder to obtain the stocklist because of their peculiar
pleading requirements. Id. at 238. Complications in the rules of mandamus resulted in further
hindrance for the shareholder. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396.
In a mandamus proceeding, allegations in the writ that were not denied in the answer
were presumed true. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396; see State ex rel. Theile v.
Cities Serv. Co., 115 A. 773, 774 (Del. 1922). However, if the defendant's answer included
statements that did not conflict with the writ, then those statements in the answer were deemed
conclusive and taken as true for the purpose of the case. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at
396; see Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 467; Theile, 115 A. at 774. Thus, if a shareholder did
not allege a proper purpose (and the statute did not require this allegation), an answer to a writ
alleging that the stockholder had an improper purpose was presumed to be true, and the writ
would be denied. Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396; see State ex reL Linihan v.
United Brokerage Co., 101 A. 433,437 (Del. 1917).
A litigant could respond to this problem by including an allegation of a proper purpose in
their petition and ask for the Superior Court to make a finding that it was a proper purpose.
Initially, because mandamus was a summary writ, the Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that
there was "no practice or procedure.. .whereby issues raised by the allegation in the petition and
the averments in the return may be submitted upon evidence to a jury for their determination."
Linihan, 101 A. at 437; see Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396. However, the
Delaware legislature responded by enacting an amendment to the mandamus procedure which
provided that any question of fact stemming from the application for a writ of mandamus and the
answer be heard and resolved by the superior court. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 564 (1953);
Note, Proper Purpose, supra note 25, at 396-97.
This meant that, as a practical matter, shareholders needed to plead a proper purpose and
thus the statutory right to inspect the stocklist was not absolute.
73. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d at 467. See also supra note 61.
74. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 238; see Jefferis v. William
D. Mullen Co., 132 A. 687, 688 (Del. Ch. 1926).
If the stockholder sought to inspect records which were in the possession of an officer or
agent of the corporation, the proper practice was to petition the court for mandamus directing the
custodian to allow inspection. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 239; see
Swift v. State ex reL Richardson, 6 A. 856, 862 (Del. Ct. Err. & App. 1886). Where an officer
or agent was not in the custody of an officer or agent, the writ was to be directed at the
corporation because the corporation itself had the duty to permit the inspection demanded. Note,
Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 240; see Bay State Gas Co. v. State ex rel.
Content, 56 A. 1114, 1119 (Del. 1904). However, the joining of an officer of a corporation as a
party defendant in an alternative writ did not violate the proceedings even if the officer was not a
necessary party. 56 A. at 1119.
75. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 239; see State ex rel.
Waldman v. Miller-Wohi Co., 28 A.2d 148, 153 (Del. Super. Ct. 1942); State ex rel. Miller v.
Loft, Inc., 156 A. 170, 172 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931). As with stocklists, if the plaintiff failed to
state any purpose for the inspection, the defendant could defeat the petition by alleging that the
plaintiff had an improper purpose. See supra note 72.
76. Loft, 156 A. at 172.
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stockholder's alleged purpose had to be proper and not adverse to the interests
of the corporation, and the shareholder had the burden of proving a proper
purpose. 77 Thus, the shareholder's right to inspect the books and records of the
corporation through a mandamus proceeding was "in no sense an absolute right,
but merely a qualified right depending upon the facts of the particular case."tm
The Chancery Court's powers under pre-1967 Delaware law were
limited. It had the power to order inspection at the request of a party to a suit
pending before the court if the documents at issue were in the possession of the
adverse party and were material to the petitioner's allegations. 79 As a practical
matter, this meant that inspection cases that were not collateral to other pending
corporate disputes had to be filed in the Superior Court.
B. The 1967 Revision of Section 220 of the Delaware General
Corporate Code
The 1967 revision of the Delaware General Corporation Law led to an
intense debate over the proper nature of shareholders' statutory inspection
rights under Delaware law. Professor Ernest Folk was the Reporter for the
1967 revision of the Delaware Corporation Code. In his 1965 Report to the
Delaware Corporation Law Revision Committee (the "Committee"), Folk
submitted a preliminary proposal concerning inspection rights. 80 Folk based his
draft provision chiefly on section 46 of the MBCA and section 624 of the New
York Business Corporations Code.81
Folk's proposed statute suggested adding several conditions to a
stockholder's right to inspect.8 2 These new prerequisites included provisions
77. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 239; see Miller-Wohl, 28
A.2d at 153; Loft, 156 A. at 172.
78. Loft, 156 A. at 172.
79. Note, Inspection of Corporate Books, supra note 67, at 240; see State ex reL Foster
v. Standard Oil Co., 18 A.2d 235, 238 (Del. Super. Ct. 1941).
80. ERNEST L. FOLK, III, FOLK'S 1965 REPORT TO THE DELAWARE CORPORATION
LAW REVISION COMMITTEE (1965) [hereinafter FOLK REPORT] (unpublished report, on file
with author).
81. Id. at 165.
82. The full text of the proposed statute reads:
Shareholder's Right of Inspection
(a) As used in this section, a shareholder shall mean:
(1) Any person who shall have been the holder of record of shares of any class
for at least six months immediately preceding his demand for inspection;
(2) Any person holding of record, or thereunto authorized in writing by the
holders of record, of at least five percent of the outstanding shares of any class;
(3) Any person or persons who shall have been a holder of a voting trust
certificate for at least six months immediately preceding his demand for
inspection, or who holds voting trust certificates representing shares aggregating
at least five percent of the outstanding shares of that class; or
(4) An attorney or other agent of any of the foregoing persons.
(b) Any such shareholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon at
least five day's written demand stating the purpose thereof, have the right during
usual business hours to examine, for any specified, reasonable and proper
purpose, the corporation's books and records of account, minutes of meetings of
the shareholders, and record of shareholders, and to make copies or extracts
therefrom. A proper purpose includes a purpose reasonably related to such
person's interest as a shareholder.
(c) An inspection authorized by subsection (b) may be denied to the shareholder
upon his refusal to furnish to the corporation, its transfer agent or registrar an
affidavit that the shareholder does not seek inspection for an improper purpose
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that: (1) the stockholder must be a stockholder of record for at least six months
immediately preceding her demand for inspection; (2) the stockholder or other
stockholders joining in the demand must own at least five percent of the
outstanding shares of any class of stock; (3) inspection could be denied if the
stockholder refused to furnish an affidavit that she did not seek the inspection
for an improper purpose and that she had not sold or offered for sale any list of
shareholders within five years; and (4) corporations would have the burden of
establishing that the purpose for which inspection was sought was not a proper
purpose.
One of the members of the Committee, Irving Morris, advocated
substantial changes to Folk's draft.8 3 Morris argued in favor of eliminating
Folk's draft's requirements that shareholders hold stock for six months or have
a five percent stake in the company, claiming that these conditions were both
unnecessary and contrary to existing Delaware law.84 Morris also objected to
Folk's suggestion that the corporation have the burden of proof to show a
stockholder had an improper purpose in all inspection cases.85 He proposed that
the revised statute place the burden on the shareholder in all cases.8 6 In
addition, in his proposed draft of new section 220, Morris advocated vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery.8 7
and that he has not within five years sold or offered for sale any list of
shareholders of any domestic or foreign corporation or aided or abetted any
person in procuring any record of shareholders for any such purpose.
(d) If the corporation, or an officer or agent thereof, refuses to permit an
inspection permitted by subsection (b), the shareholder may apply to the Superior
Court for a writ of mandamus to compel such inspection. In any such proceeding,
the corporation shall have the burden of establishing that the purpose for which
inspection is sought is not a proper purpose. The court may prescribe any
limitations or conditions, or award such other or further relief, which to the court
may seem just and proper. The court may, upon such terms and conditions as the
court may prescribe, order books, documents and records, pertinent extracts
therefrom, or duly authenticated copies thereof, to be brought within this State
and kept in such place in this State and for such time and purposes as the order
may prescribe.
(e) Nothing in this section shall impair the power of a court to compel the
production for examination of the books and records of the corporation, without
regard to the period of time during which the shareholder has been a shareholder
or to the number of shares held by him.
Id.
83. Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Members of the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Committee (Apr. 19, 1965) (on file with author).
84. In rejecting the five percent requirement, Morris argued that "[t]he key to inspection
is that the inspection be sought for a specified, reasonable and proper purpose. If a stockholder
holding less than 5% of the stock meets the test so far as his purpose is concerned, it should not
make any difference that his total holdings or those acting in concert with him are less than 5%."
Id. at 2. He also saw no reason to stop a shareholder that had recently acquired stock from
seeking an inspection if some event occurred which caused him concern about the company. Ia
at 3.
85. Id. at 4. Morris claimed it would be a "serious error" to place the burden on the
corporation in a books and records case because that would infringe on Delaware directors'
responsibility to manage the corporation. Id. at 6.
86. Morris felt that a stockholder should have the burden of demonstrating a proper
purpose in all cases because the common law placed the burden for books and records on the
shareholder and that a shareholder naturally assumes the burden for demanding inspection for
shareholder lists regardless of factual distinctions. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 8.
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Upon receiving suggestions from other members of the Committee, 88
Morris submitted a revised draft of the proposed statute to the Committee. 89
After a further meeting of the Committee on May 4, 1965, Morris prepared
two additional drafts of his proposed section 220 addressing further concerns of
the Committee's members. 90 The Delaware legislature enacted revised section
220 in 1967.91
8 8. Chancellor Collins J. Seitz, another member of the Committee, responded to Morris'letter by suggesting certain changes in the draft language, including that the statute should
contain some language making it clear that this type of case should be given expedited treatment
in the court system. Letter from Chancellor Collins J. Seitz to Irving Morris (Apr. 22, 1965) (on
file with author).
89. Draft No. 2 was written in response to Chancellor Seitz's comments and attached to a
Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Members of the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Committee (Apr. 27, 1965) (on file with author).
90. Memorandum from Irving Morris to the Members of the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Committee (May 6, 1965) (on file with author). Draft No. 3 provided for an equitable
owner of stock as well as a legal or equitable owner of a voting trust certificate to have a right ofinspection. Draft No. 4 confined the right of inspection to stockholders of record or their
attorneys or agents. In his memo to the Committee, Morris indicated that he would recommend
Draft No. 4. Id.
9 1. In the final version of the statute, the Legislature placed the burden of proof on the
corporation to prove an improper purpose where the shareholder seeks to inspect the stocklist,
and made some minor grammatical changes. The statute now provides:(a) As used in this section, "stockholder" means a stockholder of record.(b) Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon written
demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right during the usual
hours for business to inspect for any proper purpose the corporation's stock
ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records, and to make
copies or extracts therefrom. A proper purpose shall mean a purpose reasonably
related to such person's interest as a stockholder. In every instance where an
attorney or other agent shall be the person who seeks the right to inspection, the
demand under oath shall be accompanied by a power of attorney or such other
writing which authorizes the attorney or other agent to so act on behalf of the
stockholder. The demand under oath shall be directed to the corporation at its
registered office in this state or at its principal place of business.(c) If the corporation, or an officer or agent thereof, refuses to permit aninspection sought by a stockholder or attorney or other agent acting for the
stockholder pursuant to subsection (b) of this section or does not reply to the
demand within 5 business days after the demand has been made, the stockholder
may apply to the Court of Chancery for an order to compel such inspection. The
Court of Chancery is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine
whether or not the person seeking inspection is entitled to the inspection sought.
The Court may summarily order the corporation to permit the stockholder to
inspect the corporation's stock ledger, an existing list of stockholders, and its
other books and records, and to make copies or extracts therefrom; or the Court
may order the corporation to furnish to the stockholder a list of its stockholders as
of a specific date on condition that the stockholder first pay to the corporation the
reasonable cost of obtaining and furnishing such list and on such other conditions
as the Court deems appropriate. Where the stockholder seeks to inspect the
corporation's books and records, other than its stock ledger or list of
stockholders, he shall first establish (1) that he has complied with this section
respecting the form and manner of making demand for inspection of such
documents; and (2) that the inspection he seeks is for a proper purpose. Where
the stockholder seeks to inspect the corporation's stock ledger or list of
stockholders and he has complied with this section respecting the form and
manner of making demand for inspection of such documents, the burden of proof
shall be upon the corporation to establish that the inspection he seeks is for an
improper purpose. The Court may, in its discretion, prescribe any limitations or
conditions with reference to the inspection, or award such other or further relief
as the Court may deem just and proper. The Court may order books, documents
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C. Shareholder Inspection Rights Under Revised Section 220
The final version of section 220 transferred all inspection cases from the
Superior Court to the Chancery Court.92 It created a summary procedure, with
expedited discovery on limited issues and a quick trial.93
Under the revised code, the requirements for making a valid inspection
demand are straightforward. First, the shareholder making the request must be
a record holder of the corporation's stock.94 The shareholder can conduct the
inspection personally or appoint an agent to do it. Second, the demand must be
made under oath and delivered to the corporation's registered Delaware office
or principal place of business.95 Third, the shareholder must request inspection
of the corporation's stocklist and the corporation's other books and records for
a proper purpose which is reasonably related to such shareholder's interest as a
shareholder.96
If the corporation fails to produce the requested information within five
business days of the shareholder's written demand,97 Delaware law permits the
shareholder to sue in the Chancery Court to compel inspection in a summary
judicial proceeding. 98 The shareholder's complaint must state that the
shareholder has made proper demand on the corporation, and that either the
required number of days have passed without the production of the requested
and records, pertinent extracts therefrom, or duly authenticated copies thereof, to
be brought within this State and kept in this State upon such terms and conditions
as the order may prescribe.
(d) Any director shall have the right to examine the corporation's stock ledger, a
list of its stockholders and its other books and records for a purpose reasonably
related to his position as a director. The Court of Chancery is hereby vested with
the exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a director is entitled to the
inspection sought. The Court may summarily order the corporation to permit the
director to inspect any and all books and records, the stock ledger and the stock
list and to make copies or extracts therefrom. The Court may, in its discretion,
prescribe any limitations or conditions with reference to the inspection, or award
such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1993).
92. The Court of Chancery determines whether a stockholder may inspect and whether
the court has plenary jurisdiction to grant all necessary relief in facilitating inspection. 2 FOLK ET
AL., supra note 15, § 220.6.2.
93. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1993); see 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.2.
Section 220 provides that the Chancery Court should "summarily" order relief upon proper
showing on the part of party seeking inspection. Michael D. Goldman, Delaware Corporation
Law-Shareholders' Right to Make an Informed Judgment, 32 BUS. LAW. 1805, 1814 (1977).
94. Shaw v. Agri-Mark, Inc., 663 A.2d 464, 468 (Del. 1995); Rainbow Navigation,
Inc. v. Pan Ocean Navigation, Inc., 535 A.2d 1357, 1360 (Del. 1987). A beneficial owner may
act through a record holder to obtain inspection. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.3.2.
95. 2FOLKETAL.,supra note 15, § 220.6.1.
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (1993); see Ernest L. Folk, III, Corporation Law
Developments-1969, 56 VA. L. REV. 755, 757 (1970). The shareholder should also offer to
bear the reasonable costs incurred by the company in connection -with the production of the
information.
97. Pursuant to the statute, a written demand for inspection must state the purpose under
oath. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.6.1. Written authority must be furnished if
inspection is sought by an individual other than a stockholder. Id. The demand must be sent to
the corporation's registered office or principal place of business. Id.
A stockholder may sue to compel inspection under § 220 if her demand is refused or not
answered within five business days. Id. § 220.6.2. Although prior case law recognized the
necessity for demand and refusal, the five day requirement has been interpreted to be a
jurisdictional prerequisite. Id.
98. Id. § 220.3.
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information, or that the shareholder's demand has been refused by the
company.
The summary proceeding has a very narrow scope in a stocklist case. The
shareholder may obtain an ex parte order reducing the time that the defendant
has to answer the complaint and fixing an expedited trial date.99 Generally, the
answer must be filed within ten days and the trial will be set for a date a few
weeks later. 00 The timetable is more extended in a books and records case.
Discovery is limited in an inspection case:101 the defendant can take the
plaintiffs deposition, but the scope of this deposition is strictly limited to
establishing the validity of the plaintiff's stated purpose of the demand and
procedural compliance with the statute's requirements.10 2 Document production
is also limited: the defendant may ask the plaintiff to produce documents
evidencing the plaintiff's stated purpose; and to produce any corporate
documents that the plaintiff already possesses.10 3 The Chancery Court will not
expand the defendant's discovery rights to cover other matters. 10 4
Parties normally submit briefs on the merits of the inspection demand
close to the time of the hearing. 05 Frequently, the parties may choose to settle
the case as the trial date approaches and file a stipulation of dismissal. If the
case proceeds to trial, and the court grants the plaintiffs request, its order will
normally grant the immediate production of the documents.10 6 However, the
court frequently imposes certain conditions on the parties. These include that
the shareholder be given reasonable access to the information, usually by stating
that the inspection must be conducted during regular business hours at the
corporation's offices.10 7 Furthermore, in books and records cases, the court
will limit the documents provided to those which are "essential and sufficient"
99. Goldman, supra note 93, at 1814.
100. Id. at 1814. If necessary, this summary process can be shortened even further. Id.(noting Sack v. Cadence Indus. Corp., No. 4765, 1975 WL 1962 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 1975), in
which hearing and final decision completed within five days of filing complaint).
101. Id. In defining the scope of discovery inquiry into the purpose of the demand, a
ruling on the merits of a proper purpose dispute may be part of a discovery decision. Id. at 1815
(noting Bethlehem Copper Corp. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., C.A. No. 4942 (Del. Ch. 1975),
unreported, in which the court held that a limited inquiry as to the status of a plaintiffs tender
offer is a proper subject of discovery in investigating whether there is a proper purpose for
inspection, but that an inquiry into the specific tactics of the tender offer is not).
102. Id. at 1814-15 (noting General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 240 A.2d 755
(Del. Super. Ct. 1968), in which the court ruled that discovery not related to the stated purpose
was irrelevant); 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.8 (scope of deposition is limited to matters
dealing with the narrow issues in the proceeding and not collateral issues).
103. Goldman, supra note 93, at 1815; see, e.g., State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 156 A.
170 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931); General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus, Inc., 240 A.2d 755 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1968). See also 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.8 (discovery limited to
documents that will be introduced into evidence or referred to or relied on at trial).
104. Goldman, supra note 93, at 1815; see Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855,
857-58 (Del. Ch. 1969) (noting that "[tihe narrow nature of [§ 220] must be kept in mind in
applying the 'proper purpose' requirement. And that is important because there is a continuing
tendency to use a § 220 suit for broad defensive as well as other purposes in battles over
corporate control and acquisitions").
105. Goldman, supra note 93, at 1816.
106. Id.
107. The Delaware statute expressly provides that "any stockholder [of record].. .shall,
upon written demand under oath.. .have the right during the usual hours of business to inspect
for any proper purpose to inspect the corporation's stock ledger... DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
220 (1993).
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to satisfy the shareholder's stated purpose.10s This restriction protects the
corporation's sensitive business information from disclosure and stops potential
abuses by shareholders. The court may also require the shareholder to execute a
confidentiality agreement before permitting him access to corporate documents.
Since the 1967 revision, the only substantive change in section 220 was
made in 1981 with the addition of subsection (d) to the statute. This amendment
codified the common law right of a director of a Delaware corporation to
inspect the stocklist and books and records. The statute now permits a director
to obtain summary relief in the Court of Chancery to enforce her rights. 109
IV. DOES DELAWARE'S INSPECTION STATUTE WORK FOR
MONITORING SHAREHOLDERS?
Shareholders that seek to monitor management performance need to get
information about their company in a quick and inexpensive fashion. Can they
use the Delaware inspection statute to get this information cheaply and on a
timely basis?
Suppose that dissident shareholders decide to challenge incumbent
management in a proxy contest and request a list of the company's
shareholders. The corporation's management can choose from a number of
alternative courses of action. It could provide the stocklist. However, if it does
not want to do so, it will resist the shareholder's demand and force the
shareholder to follow the statutory procedures to obtain the stocklist.110
If the shareholder seeks the stocklist under the inspection statute, the
corporation can still refuse to produce the stocklist by claiming that the
stockholder has not stated a proper purpose or that the stockholder has failed to
comply with the other statutory requirements. Now, the shareholder must
resort to court proceedings to secure the stocklist. If the corporation denies the
validity of the shareholder's stated purpose, the shareholder will seek an
expedited trial on this issue.
In the meantime, the shareholder is delayed in starting its proxy
solicitation and the incumbent management has more time to formulate its own
plans and strategy. In addition, the shareholder is required to spend time and
money on these judicial proceedings. In a proxy contest for corporate control,
all of these factors work to the incumbent management's advantage in the
solicitation."'
108. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.5.
109. 2 id. § 220.1; H.R. 16, 131st Gen. Assembly 10, 63 Del. Laws ch. 25, § 9 (1981).
110. In a proxy contest for corporate control, this is almost invariably management's
response. James B. Watson, Protecting the Shareholders' Right to Inspect the Share Register in
Corporate Proxy Contests for the Election of Directors, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1273 (1977).
111. Id. at 1277. If the corporation chooses to engage in stall tactics, the corporation runs
the risk that a successful shareholder will attack its reputation.
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Associated With
Request for Stockholder List by Outcome(Dismissals Without Further Information are considered unsuccessful)
Standard
Variable Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
PanelA: Plaintiff'Obtains Stockholder List (N = 71)
DELAY 111.9 168.4 9 43 980
PLTPAGES 81.1 111.9 4 39 700
DEFPAGES 56.7 91.2 0 18 500
TOTPAGES 137.8 187.9 8 66 1,200
PLTITOTAL 68.4% 22.6% 6.0% 71.4% 100.0%
INDADJROA -9.3% 38.0% -203.3% 0.5% 24.4%
Panel B: PlaintiffDoes Not Obtain Stockholder List (N = 20)
DELAY 187.2 256.5 9 70 876
PLTPAGES 128.1 344.5 4 19 1,550
DEFPAGES 79.7 177.6 0 5 600
TOTPAGES 207.8 493.9 7 26 2,150
PLTrOTAL 70.3% 31.4% 6.3% 74.8% 100.0%
INDADJROA 0.8% 9.2% -22.3% 1.7% 16.0%
Panel C: t-statistics for Tests ofDifferences InMeans ,
and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for Tests ofDifferences In Medians Between Panels A andB
Variable t-statistic
Wilcoxon
Z-staistic
DELAY 1.24 1.02
PLTPAGES 0.60 2.56***
DEFPAGES 0.56 1.55
TOTPAGES 0.62 1.83*
PLTrOTAL 0.25 0.95
INDADJROA 1.69* 0.36
*** The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .01 level.
* The variables in Panels A and B are statistically different at the .10 level.
a Variable definitions are as follows:
DELAY Number of days between demand and outcome dates
PLTPAGES Number of pages filed by plaintiff.
DEFPAGES Number of pages filed by defendant
TOTPAGES Total number of pages filed by plaintiffand defendant.
PLTTOTAL Percentage of total litigation pages filed by plaintiff.
INDADJROA Industry-adjusted return on assets. Return on assets is calculated as
Operating income before depreciation and taxes (COMPUSTAT item 13)
divided by total assets (COMPUSTST item 6). INDADJROA is calculated
as the firm's return on assets minus the average for the industry based on the
firm's 2-digit SIC code.
b Due to unavailable accounting data, the subsample for INDADJROA contains only 47
observations in panel A and 15 observations in panel B.
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Table 2
Frequency Distribution of Stated Purposes for Use of Stockholder List
1. To value the firm's stock
2. To contact shareholders
about soliciting proxies or
written consents
3. To contact shareholders
about a tender offer
4. To nvstigate whether
management is breaching
its fiduciary duty to
shareholders through
mrismanagerrent
negligence, waste, fraud,
self.dealig etc.
5. To communicate with
other shareholders
regarding proposals by
management or proposals
to be voted on at the
annual meeting
6. To fulfill fiduciary duty as
a member of the Board of
Directors
7. Nsc llaneous
S. Not stated
Total.
P anfiff
Obtains List
Decision
in Favor
of Dism
Plaintiff With
4
13 23
5 10
a Total exceeds total number offilings from Table 1 (91) due to multiple purposes given.
1996]
PlaintiffDoes Not
Obtain List
List
S
Decision
Against
Plaintiff
0
2
0
0
0
0
4
Dismissal
Without
List
2
8
Dinilssal
without
Further
Information
4
3
3
0
1
1
1
0
13
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Table 3
Descriptive Statistics of Variables Associated With
Request for Books and Records by Outcome
(Dismissals Without Further Information are considered unsuccessful)
Standard
Variable- Mean Deviation Minimum Median Maximum
PanelA: Plainiff Obtains StockholderList (N = 36)
DELAY 210.7 242.4 9 109 980
PLTPAGES 93.3 219.3 6 35 1,342
DEFPAGES 55.6 85.4 0 13 341
TOTPAGES 148.9 277.8 8 61 1,648
PLTTOTAL 70.0% 25.3% 20.0% 74.5% 100.0%
1NDADJROA b 1.4% 13.8% -38.1% 0.8% 21.9%
Panel B: PlaintffDoes Not Obtain Stockholder List (N = 17)
DELAY 347.8 275.6 27 259 876
PLTPAGES 86.8 171.1 4 25 700
DEFPAGES 59.5 119.7 0 19 500
TOTPAGES 146.4 288.7 6 46 1,200
PLTTOTAL 67.5% 27.4% 6.3% 72.7% 100.0%
INDADJROA -1.2% 11.0% -22.3% 1.7% 7.2%
Panel C: t-statistics for Tests ofDifferences in Means
and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for Tests ofDifferences in Medians Between Panels A andB
Wilcoxon
Variable t-statistic Z-statistic
DELAY 1.84* 2.00**
PLTPAGES 0.11 1.19
DEFPAGES 0.12 0.07
TOTPAGES 0.03 0.51
PLTTOTAL 0.34 0.29
INDADJROA 0.40 0.27
l* The variables in panels A and B are statistically different at the .05 level.
* The variables in Panels A and B are statistically different at the .10 level.
a Variable definitions are as follows:
DELAY Number of days between demand and outcome dates
PLTPAGES Number of pages filed by plaintiff.
DEFPAGES Number of pages filed by defendant.
TOTPAGES Total number of pages filed by plaintiff and defendant.
PLTTOTAL Percentage of total litigation pages filed by plaintiff.
INDADJROA Industry-adjusted return on assets. Return on assets is calculated as
ope.rating income before depreciation and taxes (COMPUSTAT item 13)
divided by total assets (COMPUSTST item 6). INDADJROA is calculated
as the fim's return on assets minus the average for the industry based on the
firm's 2-digit SIC code.
b Due to unavailable accounting data, the subsample for INDADJROA contains only 15
observations in panel A and 6 observations in panel B.
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Table 4
Frequency Distribution of Stated Purposcs for Use of Books and Records (B&R)
Plaintiff PlaintiffDoes Not
ObtainB&R Obtain B&R
Decision Dismissal
in Favor Decision Dismissal Without
of Dismissal Against Without Futher
Plaintiff With B&R Plaintiff B&R Information
1. To value the finn's stock 6 11 0 2 10
2. To contact shareholders
about soliciting proxies or 2 6 2 0 0
written consents
3. To contact shareholders
about a tender offer 0 2 1 0 0
4. To investigate whether
management is breaching
its fiduciary duty to
shareholders through 5 11 1 2 4Mismanagement,n~ll .. wa frad,
Bcfea etc.
5. To communicate with
other shareholders
rgarding proposalsby 0 2 1 0 0
management or proposals
to be voted on at the
annual meeting
6. To fAfiIl fiduciary duty as
a member of the Board of 2 2 0 0 1
Diroctors
7. Miscellaneous 1 3 0 2 1
Total' 16 37 5 6 16
a Total exceeds total number of flings from Table 3 (53) due to multiple purposes &men.
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If the shareholder's purpose in requesting the inspection was to obtain a
stocklist in order to communicate with the shareholders to seek their proxies to
oust the management, the Chancery Court will order its production.12 The
corporation then can attempt to secure a stay of execution of the order by filing
an appeal from the Chancery Court's decision.
A. The Costs, Delays and Success of Shareholders Under the
Delaware Inspection Statute
Litigation takes time and costs money. A recent empirical study of cases
filed under the Delaware inspection statute examined stockholders' success in
obtaining stocklists and books and records, the delays associated with these cases
and their cost."13 The analysis of the stocklist statute used data from a sample of
ninety-one cases filed under section 220 in the Delaware Chancery Court
during the period 1982-1994.114 Plaintiffs obtained the stocklist in seventy-one
of ninety-one, or seventy-eight percent, of the cases reported:15 Of these
seventy-one cases, the court entered a decision in favor of the plaintiff in
twenty-five cases, while in the remaining forty-six cases, the litigation was
dismissed with the plaintiff receiving the stocklist."16
Plaintiffs did not receive the stocklist in twenty, or twenty-two percent,
of the cases included in the sample." 7 Of these cases, the court denied the
shareholders' request for a stocklist four times. In the other sixteen cases, the
litigation was dismissed without providing for the shareholders to receive the
stocklist.1 8 Thus, while this article cannot conclude, as some scholars have
claimed," 9 that shareholders obtain a stocklist in all cases filed under stocklist
statutes, it seems apparent that they get them in a very high percentage of cases.
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the variables included in the
study.' 20 The first variable, DELAY, is the number of days between outcome
112. In these circumstances, the incumbent management may suffer a public relationsdefeat in the eyes of the company's shareholders because the opposition shareholder group will
undoubtedly paint their defeat as evidence that they are not acting in shareholders' best interests.
113. Thomas & Martin, supra note 13.
114. Id. at 6. The data for this study were compiled by searching the public records of the
Court of Chancery for New Castle County in the State of Delaware. Initially, the researchersidentified approximately 250 cases filed under the Delaware inspection statutes. Researchers
gathered data on all of these cases. Those cases for which complete data were unavailable were
discarded from the sample. The remaining 91 cases were used in the study. Id.
115. See Table 1, supra at page 350.
116. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at Table 1.
117. See Table 1, supra at page 350.
118. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at Table 1. In all 16 of these cases, thelitigation was dismissed and a stipulation of dismissal was filed that did not provide for theproduction of the stocklist. The author contacted the attorneys of record in all of these cases to
inquire whether a stocklist had been produced despite the silence of the stipulation of dismissal.
In four cases, the attorneys recalled that no stocklist had been produced. In the remaining 12
cases, the attorneys did not remember a stocklist being produced. Id.
119. See, e.g., Black, Next Steps, supra note 19, at 31 ("The state courts always order
the company to turn over the list.").
120. Because the sample includes substantial outliers for some variables, it is more
informative to compare medians rather than means, although both are shown in the table for
completeness. Panel A presents summary statistics for those cases where the plaintiff obtained
the stocklist, while Panel B provides the same statistics for those cases where the plaintiff did
not get a stocklist. Panel C shows t-statistics for differences in the variable means and Wilcoxon
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and demand dates. It measures the length of time that it takes for a plaintiffs
demand to be resolved.121 The median (mean) delay for shareholders obtaining
the stocklist is forty-three days (112 days), while the median (mean) delay for
shareholders not obtaining the stocklist is seventy days (187 days).' 22
The next three variables shown in Table 1 measure the number of pages
of litigation materials filed in the lawsuit. The number of pages of litigation
filings is used as a proxy for the cost of the lawsuit-the more pages filed, the
greater the legal -expenses incurred. 23 This is consistent with anecdotal
evidence from practicing Delaware attorneys. The attorneys interviewed
estimated that a simple stocklist case would cost $10,000 to $25,000 to bring to
trial, but that this cost would go up sharply if the demand was strongly
resisted.124
This variable is then broken into pages filed by the plaintiff
(PLTPAGES), pages filed by the defendant (DEFPAGES) and the total number
of pages filed by both parties (TOTPAGES). The mean levels of these variables
are influenced by large outliers, making the median levels of the variables
likely to be more informative. Unsuccessful shareholders have slightly (but
insignificantly) higher mean numbers of pages filed for all three categories of
variables. 125 Looking at the medians, however, this pattern is reversed: the
median number of pages filed is significantly higher (for two of the three
categories) in cases where plaintiffs succeed in obtaining the stocklist.126 This
result is consistent with the intuition that increasing the number of pages filed
should increase the likelihood that the plaintiff will obtain the stocklist.' 27
Table 1 also presents data on the operating return on assets adjusted for
two-digit SIC code industry means (INDADJROA) for the fiscal year just prior
to the year in which the stocklist demand was made for the sixty-two firms that
were publicly traded and for which data was available.128 As shown on Table 1,
Z-statistics for differences in the variable medians.
121. The demand date is the date on which the plaintiff made its written demand on the
corporation to provide a stocklist. This date is taken from the demand letter sent to the
corporation by the shareholder that is attached to the shareholder's complaint when it is filed
with the Chancery Court.
The outcome date is taken from the court's order or the parties' stipulation. If the case is
decided by court order in favor of the plaintiff, we used the date for production of the stocklist as
the outcome date. If the request was denied, we used the date of the court's order as the outcome
date. For stipulations, we used the date of entry of the stipulation as the outcome date for denials
of the stocklist. Where the parties agreed to the production of the stocklist, we used the date of
production in the stipulation as the outcome date.
122. The differences between the two groups are not significantly different at the .05
level.
123. Obviously, there are other expenses involved in litigating any lawsuit. However, it is
reasonable to assume that the cost of the litigation will increase as the number of pages of
materials increases.
124. While this is significantly lower than the estimates generated by other scholars,
compare, Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 68 (cost of stocklist litigation is "a
few hundred thousand dollars"), it is still a substantial cost for many shareholders.
125. See Table 1, supra at page 350.
126. See Table 1, supra at page 350.
127. The percentage of the total number of pages filed by the defendant measures the
relative burdens on the parties of litigating these cases (DEFTOTAL). The hypothesis was that a
higher proportion of pages filed by the defendant should be observed in cases where the plaintiff
does not obtain the stocklist. However, as shown in Panel C, only the univariate test for the
medians demonstrates such a relationship.
128. This measure has been used in numerous studies recently in the accounting and
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in the cases where the plaintiff obtains the stocklist, the average INDADJROA
is (9.3)% compared to +0.9% for the sample in which the plaintiff fails to get
the stocklist. 129
Table 2 gives statistics on shareholders' stated purposes for demanding
the stocklist. As noted above, under Delaware law, a shareholder must state a
lawful and germane purpose for wanting to obtain the stocklist, the proper
purpose requirement. The proper purpose requirement is intended to weed out
unwarranted demands for stocklists by screening out improper demands.
Purposes 2, 3 and 5 are directly related to intra-shareholder
communications and accounted for sixty-one percent of the stated purposes. 130
Shareholders stating one of these three purposes succeeded over eighty-three
percent of the time in obtaining the stocklist, while other shareholders were
successful seventy percent of the time. 131 Thus, shareholders demanding a
stocklist to communicate with other shareholders were successful more
frequently than others, but still failed to obtain the stocklist in seventeen percent
of the cases filed.
Table 3 presents summary statistics concerning fifty-three cases filed
under the books and records statute during the same time period. 132 Plaintiffs
succeeded in obtaining books and records in about sixty-eight percent (thirty-
six of fifty-three) of the cases filed.133 Of these successes, thirteen were by
court order and twenty-three by agreement of the parties. In the seventeen cases
where the shareholders failed to obtain the books and records, three were by
court order and the remaining fourteen were through dismissals without
obtaining the information.134
As in the stocklist study, DELAY is defined as the number of days
between outcome and demand dates. It measures the length of time that it takes
for a plaintiff's demand to be resolved. The median (mean) delay for
shareholders obtaining books and records is 109 days (210 days), while the
median (mean) delay for shareholders not obtaining books and records is 259
days (348 days). 135 The median and mean differences between the two groups
are significantly different.
The next three variables shown in Table 3 measure the number of pages
of litigation materials filed in the lawsuit. Delaware attorneys interviewed
estimated that a simple books and records case would cost $25,000 to $50,000
finance literature. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 11.
129. While the averages are statistically significant at the 10% level, the medians are not
significantly different. See Table 1, supra at page 350.
130. See Table 2, supra at page 351.
131. These differences were not statistically significant at the 10% level. See Thomas &
Martin, supra note 13, at 17.
132. Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 6. In Table 3, panel A presents summary
statistics for those cases where the plaintiff obtained books and records, while panel B provides
the same statistics for those cases where the plaintiff did not get the books and records. Panel C
shows t-statistics for differences in the variable means and Wilcoxon Z-statistics for differences
in the variable medians.
133. See Table 3, supra at page 352.
134. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 12. The author contacted the attorneys of
record in the cases where the dismissals filed did not provide for the production of the books and
records. In 12 of the 14 dismissals by the parties, the attorneys did not recall that books and
records had been produced. Id.
135. See Table 3, supra at page 352.
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to bring to trial, but that this cost would go up sharply if the demand was
strongly resisted.136
As in the stocklist study, this variable is broken into pages filed by the
plaintiff (PLTPAGES), pages filed by the defendant (DEFPAGES) and the total
number of pages filed by both parties (TOTPAGES). The mean levels of these
variables are influenced by large outliers, making the median levels of the
variables likely to be more informative. Unsuccessful shareholders have lower
(insignificantly) mean and median numbers of pages filed for two of the three
categories of variables. 137
Table 3 further presents data on the operating return on assets adjusted
for two-digit SIC code industry means (INDADJROA) for the fiscal year just
prior to the year in which the books and records demand was made for the
twenty-one firms that were publicly traded and for which data was available.138
In the cases where the plaintiff obtains the books and records, the average
INDADJROA is +1.4% compared to (1.2)% for the sample in which the
plaintiff fails to get the books and records. 139
Table 4 presents a frequency distribution by outcome of shareholders'
stated purposes for demanding books and records. Purposes 4 and 6 are related
to shareholders' investigation of corporate mismanagement or their fulfillment
of their fiduciary duties as directors. These are the types of purposes that would
be stated by shareholder monitors of potential corporate wrongdoing. These
cases accounted for thirty-five percent of the stated purposes. Shareholders that
gave one of these two purposes succeeded 71.5% of the time in obtaining books
and records, while shareholders stating other purposes succeeded about 63.5%
of the time.140
What are the implications of these results for shareholders seeking to use
these statutes to obtain information about their company? First, it is apparent
that shareholders are not always successful in obtaining the information they
desire through the use of the inspection statute, especially if they are seeking
books and records. Second, shareholders seeking books and records under these
statutes must be prepared to wait months for a result, with the delays being
substantially longer than in stocklist cases.
In both kinds of cases, they will pay substantial attorneys' fees to litigate
their case. Delaware attorneys estimated that these fees would run $10,000 to
$25,000 for simple stocklist cases and $20,000 to $50,000 for straightforward
books and records cases. 141 In more complex, contested cases, these costs would
be significantly greater.
136. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 14.
137. The percentage of the total number of pages filed by the defendant is a measure of
relative burdens on the parties of litigating these cases (DEFTOTAL). The study hypothesized
that a higher proportion of pages filed by the defendant should be observed in cases where the
plaintiff does not obtain books and records. However, as indicated in panel C, both univariate
tests fail to show such a relationship.
138. This measure has been used in numerous studies recently in the accounting and
finance literature. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 11.
139. These differences are not statistically different for either the means or the medians.
See Table 3, supra at page 352.
140. See Table 4, supra at page 353.
141. These fees would escalate if the cases were seriously contested by the corporation,
particularly for books and records cases.
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B. Should Shareholder Plaintiffs Bring a Books and Records Case
Before Filing a Derivative or Class Action?
Shareholders file derivative lawsuits when they believe that there has
been corporate wrongdoing and the corporation has not acted to stop it.
However, the shareholder must make "demand" on the corporation's board of
directors to weigh the asserted allegations and exercise their discretion under
the business judgment rule to decide whether to file a claim on behalf of the
corporation. 142 A shareholder's right to bring this type of action "is limited to
situations where the stockholder has demanded that the directors pursue the
corporate claim and they have wrongfully refused to do so or where demand is
excused because the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision
regarding such litigation."' 43 The complaint must plead particularized facts
showing a wrongful refusal of demand, or that demand was futile, in order to
survive a motion to dismiss.
In almost every derivative action, the defendants will file a motion to
dismiss the complaint under Rule 23.1 claiming that it fails to allege facts
sufficient to establish wrongful refusal or excusal of demand. In Delaware, a
shareholder plaintiff is not entitled to discovery prior to responding to a Rule
23.1 motion to dismiss."44 Shareholders must rely solely on the allegations of
their complaint. 45
The potential use of the books and records prong of the Delaware
inspection statute as a discovery device in shareholder derivative actions was
highlighted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Rales v. Blasband4 6 There, the
court observed that "[slurprisingly, little use has been made of section 220 as an
information-gathering tool in the derivative context."1 47 It suggested that
shareholders should employ section 220 to conduct a "deliberate and thorough"
142. 3 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 327.4; see Schick Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing &
Textile Workers Union, 511 A.2d 1235, 1240 (Del. Ch. 1987), The business judgment rule is '
'a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis in good faith and in the honest belief that the action was taken in the best interests
of the company."' ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 123-24 (1986) (quoting Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
143. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993) (quoting Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991)); see generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
144. See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 208 (Del. 1991). But see Zapata, 430 A.2d at
788 (recognizing that a court has the right to order limited discovery where a board has delegated
its power to dismiss a derivative suit to a special litigation committee, and that committee moves
for dismissal or summary judgment). See also Note, Discovery in Federal Demand-Refused
Derivative Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1025, 1029 (1992) (arguing that in derivative actions
in federal court, Federal Rule of Procedure 23.1 does not block discovery because it does not
require shareholder plaintiffs to plead wrongful demand refusals with a high degree of
specificity).
A plaintiff shareholder's burden under a Rule 23.1 motion to dismiss is more arduous
than that required to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion. 3 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 327.4; see
Levine, 591 A.2d at 207. However, "plaintiffs are not required to plead evidence inasmuch as
discovery is foreclosed." 3 FOLK Er AL., supra note 15, § 327.4.
145. Although derivative plaintiffs have a formidable burden to meet at the pleading stage
without the benefit of discovery, there are additional avenues to obtain information relating to the
subject of their claims. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934-35 n.10. Details of a corporate act may be
discoverable through a variety of public sources of information, including the media and
government agencies such as the Securities Exchange Commission. Id.
146. Id.at934n.10.
147. Id.
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investigation prior to filing a complaint alleging director misconduct.
The idea of using section 220 in this manner is appealing. It gives
derivative plaintiffs an avenue to obtain discovery before filing their suits
which could lead to a reduction in the number of frivolous derivative suits. A
section 220 action also alleviates the unfairness of forcing shareholders to
respond to a motion to dismiss based on the substance of their complaint
without the benefit of discovery. Furthermore, even if Delaware were to
permit discovery in responding to a motion to dismiss under Rule 23.1,
shareholders should get the same corporate records faster through the
inspection statutes than the regular discovery process because cases filed under
the inspection statutes are expedited. 148
Plaintiffs in securities fraud class actions might also consider using the
Delaware inspection statute as a method of obtaining information.149 This
potential use has become particularly important in light of the stricter fraud
pleading requirements imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
legislation passed by Congress. Under the new pleading requirements, plaintiffs
must allege sufficient facts showing fraud to create a strong inference that the
defendant acted with the requisite state of mind.150 If these pleading
requirements are not met, the new legislation creates a presumption that the
defendants are entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
defending the action.151
A plaintiff seeking to use the Delaware inspection statute to uncover
evidence to bolster a securities fraud case would need to allege a proper
purpose, one reasonably related to its interest in the corporation and not
adverse to the company. 152 This purpose could include inspecting the company's
books and records to determine if fraud or mismanagement are occurring, or
continuing, where there is a pending action against the company.153 This
purpose would be proper even if the inspection would lead to increased
damages being awarded against the company because the company has no
legitimate interest in avoiding payment of compensatory damages which it may
owe to its owners. 54
What implications do the empirical results discussed above have for the
future of the Delaware books and records statute as a pre-suit discovery device
for plaintiffs in derivative and class actions? In cases where plaintiffs have
strong reasons to suspect corporate wrongdoing, and enough evidence to
establish demand futility, or plead fraud with particularity, they will not wait
148. SA FLETCHER, supra note 26, § 2213. A shareholder who demands inspection is not
precluded from enforcing her right simply because she has another suit pending against the
corporation and could obtain the same books and records through discovery. Id. Where a proper
purpose is shown, a shareholder's right to inspect books and records under § 220 of the
Delaware Corporate Code is absolute and apart from litigation. Estate of Polin v. Diamond State
Poultry Co., No. 6374, 1981 WL 7612, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 1981). Cf. Lipman v.
National Med. Waste, Inc., C.A. No. 12260 (Del. Ch. May 4, 1992), slip op. at 3 (§ 220 action
is not a substitute for discovery in a civil action).
149. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13.
150. See Conference Report on Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 1995 DER 231
d99, available in LEXIS, at *13-14.
151. Id.
152. See Compaq Computer Corp. v. Horton, 631 A.2d 1, 5 (Del. 1993).
153. Id. at 7.
154. Id. at 9.
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the additional four to six months necessary to win a books and records case
before filing their derivative action. However, in cases where the shareholder is
uncertain they will be able to establish that demand is excused, or that they have
sufficient basis for believing that corporate wrongdoing has occurred, they
might consider using section 220 as a discovery device.
A plaintiff in this position should consider several negative factors before
filing a books and records action. First, filing litigation under section 220 does
not guarantee a shareholder access to corporate books and records. In roughly
one-third of the books and records cases filed under the statute, the plaintiff
does not obtain any documents.155 Second, a plaintiff will face substantial delays
and significant costs, at least $10,000 to $25,000, in litigating its books and
records case before even determining if they should file a derivative action. 156
Finally, plaintiffs seeking to uncover corporate wrongdoing do not appear to
enjoy any higher rate of success than other plaintiffs in books and records
actions.
The plaintiff must weigh against these costs the potential benefits of
examining the corporation's books and records. These benefits will be
particularly significant for plaintiffs suing nonregistered companies for which
there may be few alternative public sources of information. 157 Even with
registered companies, a successful books and records case will give the plaintiff
access to otherwise unavailable internal company documents, such as corporate
minutes and by-laws. 58 This information might be crucial to providing a basis
for adequately pleading demand excusal in a derivative action, or pleading
fraud with particularity in a securities fraud action. Furthermore, if after
examination of the corporation's books and records, plaintiffs could not find
enough evidence of wrongdoing to warrant pursuing their derivative or
securities fraud claims, they could dismiss those cases and save themselves
further expense.
On balance, while the idea of utilizing the Delaware books and records
statute as a means of pre-suit discovery for derivative and class plaintiffs has
intuitive appeal, and could lead to the dismissal of some weak cases, many
plaintiffs will be reluctant to rely on such an uncertain, lengthy, and costly
procedure to learn if they should bring an action for corporate wrongdoing. If
Delaware wants to provide shareholder plaintiffs with a better system of pre-
suit discovery through its books and records statute, it should streamline the
existing statutory procedure, In Section V, this article examines the arguments
in favor of amending the Delaware inspection statute to provide for quicker
trials, attorney fee awards against defendants that unjustifiably resist legitimate
demands by shareholders and a more liberal access for plaintiffs.
155. Those plaintiffs that do obtain documents will only get those documents that are
"essential and sufficient" to accomplish their stated purpose. 2 FOLK E" AL., supra note 15, §
220.5. These documents may also be subject to a confidentiality agreement. Id.
156. Of course, if a plaintiff must incur these costs in order to find out if it has a sufficient
basis for a lawsuit, this will discourage the filing of frivolous lawsuits.
157. Section 12 of the 1934 Exchange Act requires any company which has a class of
securities traded on a national securities exchange to register with the SEC. In addition, § 12(g)
and Rule 12g-1 require companies with more than 500 shareholders and $5 million or more in
total assets to register with the SEC. Registered companies must file mandatory disclosure
statements with the SEC. These documents are a source of information about the company.
158. See supra note 11, for further explanation of what constitutes a corporation's books
and records.
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C. Should the Federal Stocklist Rule Be Strengthened?
Shareholders seeking to obtain the corporation's stocklist can try to
obtain it under federal law using Rule 14a-7. 159 However, Rule 14a-7 has the
disadvantage from a shareholder's perspective that it does not require a
corporation to furnish a stocklist to the requesting shareholder. Rather, Rule
14a-7 gives the corporation the election either to furnish the stocklist or to
mail, at the expense of the requesting stockholder, copies of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, or other communication furnished by the
stockholder. This has led legal commentators to nickname Rule 14a-7, "The
SEC's Useless Disclose or Mail Rule."16 0
The corporation invariably elects the second option and mails the
dissident stockholder's proxy materials. Corporate incumbents prefer to mail
the stockholder's materials because this permits the corporation to retain
exclusive possession of the stocklist. Without a stocklist, the shareholders cannot
personally lobby all of the shareholders and must rely on the corporation to
make any future mailings, too. Moreover, this option prevents shareholders
from launching a "first strike" because the corporation controls the timing of
the mailing and has prior knowledge of the contents of the materials to be
mailed. As a practical matter, Rule 14a-7's ineffectiveness has meant that
shareholders use state, rather than federal, law to obtain stocklists.
In a 1991 rulemaking proposal, the SEC noted that Rule 14a-7 did little
to insure shareholders of access to a stocklist.161 In its release, the SEC
proposed:
to amend the registrant's existing choice to mail a requesting
securityholder's proxy material rather than produce a securityholder list
upon request, and to transfer that choice to the requesting
securityholder. Moreover, the proposed amendment would expand the
scope of the list to encompass the names, addresses and securities
holdings of both record and nonobjecting beneficial owners
("NOBO's") or consenting beneficial owners ("COBO's"). 162
The SEC also solicited public comment on numerous other changes to the old
rule. 163
If this proposal had been adopted, shareholders would have had an
absolute right to obtain a stocklist under federal law at little cost and within a
few days of making their demand. 164 A vigorous debate ensued over the
necessity of amending this rule. On one side of the debate were the defenders of
the status quo, led primarily by incumbent corporate management. 165 This
group believed the federal proxy system and related state laws regulating
159. SEC Rule 14a-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1991).
160. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 69.
161. Exchange Act Release No. 29315 (June 17, 1991). See generally, Black, Disclosure,
Not Censorship, supra note 3.
162. Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 65-67 (quoting text of SEC
proposal).
163. For a summary of the various changes proposed in the initial release, see id. at 65-
75.
164. Under Rule 14a-7, the defendants cannot claim that the shareholder is seeking the
stocklist for an improper purpose as a basis for obtaining judicial review. This makes it harder
for the corporation to justify delaying producing the stocklist.
165. Robert D. Rosenbaum, Foundations of San& The Weak Premises Underlying the
Current Push for Proxy Rule Changes, 17 J. CORP. L. 163 (1991).
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communication worked very well for shareholders, and that the SEC lacked
jurisdiction to enact a broader rule.' 66
The advocates of change argued that Rule 14a-7 chilled the ability and
willingness of shareholders to effectively launch a proxy campaign and to
exercise their voting rights in an informed manner. 67 They claimed that the
rule undercut Congressional intent, as reflected in section 14(a), to preserve
stockholder voting as a meaningful check on corporate managers. They also
claimed that the SEC could expand Rule 14a-7 without fear of overstepping its
jurisdiction.168
The SEC accepted the argument that the state stocklist laws work well for
shareholders in making its revisions to Rule 14a-7. Although the revised Rule
14a-7 cures several of the problems in the prior rule, it continues to give
management the option either to provide the stockholder with a stocklist or to
mail the shareholder's materials for it.169 For that reason, the new rule is likely
to remain largely unused by shareholders. 70
166. Black, Next Steps, supra note 19, at 31 (quoting Regulation of Communication
among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release No. 30,849 [1992 Transfer binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,002 (June 24, 1992), at 82,833).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. In two limited cases, the corporation may no longer choose whether to send the
stockholder's proxy materials or to provide them with a stockholder list. These are when the
corporation is soliciting or intends to solicit with respect to a roll-up transaction or a transaction
subject to the Commission's going private rule. Id. In these two instances, the requesting
stockholder determines whether the corporation shall furnish a list of stockholders or shall mail
their materials.
170. Several important changes, however, were made to the rule. For example, it now
permits beneficial holders, as well as record holders, to make a stockholder list request. Id. at
38. The rule requires a beneficial owner to provide the corporation with a statement confirming
its beneficial ownership of the company's stock. Furthermore, the new rule allows a stockholder
request "[i]f the registrant has made or intends to make a proxy solicitation in connection with a
security holder meeting or action by consent or authorization." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1993). This language makes the rule available when the company engages in a written consent
solicitation.
Numerous requirements were added to Rule 14a-Tthat stockholders must comply with
when making a request. The revised rule requires the requesting stockholder to provide the
corporation with an affidavit identifying the proposal or other action for which the corporation is
soliciting or intends to solicit which is the subject of their solicitation or communication. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c)(2). The stockholder must attest that they will not use the information
provided by the corporation for any purpose other than solicitation of stockholders regarding the
proposal or corporate action specified. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c)(2)(i). Stockholders must also
attest that they "will not disclose such information to any person other than a beneficial owner
for whom the request was made and an employee or agent to the extent necessary to effectuate
the communication or solicitation." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(c)(2)(ii). Finally, if provided with a
stockholder list, the stockholder must return the list and not retain any copies of it or any
information derived from it after the termination of the solicitation. 240 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(d).
All of these changes are designed to ensure proper use of the stockholder list and to protect the
confidentiality of stockholder information.
The revised rule tightens the time periods during which a corporation must respond to a
Rule 14a-7 request. A corporation now must "[d]eliver [a response to a request].. .wthin five
business days after receipt." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1). This five business day limitation
applies even if the corporation elects to provide a stockholder list. As a result, corporate
incumbents have very little discretion in determining when to respond to a request.
The revised rule further requires the corporation when furnishing a stockholder list to
provide the requesting stockholder with the approximate number of record and beneficial
holders. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(1)(ii). These numbers must be separated by type of holder
and class of security. Id. This change enables stockholders to concentrate their solicitation
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What implications do the statistics concerning the Delaware statute have
for the debate over reforming federal law? First, shareholders generally get a
stocklist when they file litigation under the Delaware statute1 7 ' In over
seventy-eight percent of the cases studied, shareholders get a stocklist.
Furthermore, only a few "failures," less than five percent, result from a state
court judgment denying the shareholders' request for a stocklist.
Some caution must be taken in interpreting these results. First, they do
not indicate how many times companies refuse to turn over the stocklist and the
shareholder does not file litigation either because of the cost or because
litigation will not lead to timely access to the stocklist.l72 Furthermore, in some
of these cases, the shareholders may be using the suit as a means to get other
relief and may therefore be satisfied to drop the case without obtaining the
stocklist.
Taking these caveats into account, it appears that the Delaware courts are
granting most shareholders' claims for stocklists. Nevertheless, even for
successful litigants, the state court procedure entails substantial delays and
significant costs. 173 Unsuccessful litigants incur similar costs and wait even
longer for a result.' 74 By comparison, if Rule 14a-7 had been amended in the
manner the SEC originally proposed in 1991, shareholders using the rule would
have been able to obtain a stocklist with little delay or cost.
In short, the empirical research on the Delaware statute supports
shareholders' claims that federal law could be revised to provide them with a
less expensive, quicker method for obtaining a stocklist.175 However, it also
shows that the Delaware courts are weeding out a small number of unwarranted
stocklist demands. Any reform of federal law, or existing Delaware law, that
removes the courts from the process risks increasing the number of
efforts on the larger stockholders while also conducting a modest solicitation of smaller
stockholders. However, stockholders' ability to obtain information about "any more limited
group of such holders designated by the security holder" is restricted to information "available or
retrievable under the registrant's or its transfer agent's security holder data system." Id.
If the issuer elects to provide the stockholder list, the revised rule requires it to furnish,
in addition to the list of record holders, a NOBO/COBO list if the corporation has obtained or
obtains such a list for its own use prior to the stockholder meeting or other stockholder action.
Thus, whenever the corporation elects to provide the list, the corporation and the stockholder
will have equal access to the NOBO/COBO list to disseminate proxy materials directly to the
beneficial owner. Black, Next Steps, supra note 19, at 38.
The revised rule is ambiguous as to whether the stockholders can get a CEDE
breakdown. But the SEC's comments to the revised rule state that the list information must
include "the names, addresses, and security positions of record holders, including banks,
brokers and similar intermediaries." 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7(a)(2)(ii). It therefore seems likely
that the stockholders are assured continued access to a CEDE breakdown.
171. See Table 1, supra at page 350, and accompanying text.
172. However, some shareholders also will get stocklists from companies without having
to file an action under the inspection statutes because the company knows that the court will
almost certainly order production. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 13, at 19. Companies do
not generally report stockholder requests for stocklists in their SEC or other public filings so the
author has been unable to determine the frequency with which these different events occur.
173. See Table 1, supra at page 350, and accompanying text.
174. See Table 1, supra at page 350, and accompanying text. This suggests that at least
part of the existing delays and costs may be a necessary part of differentiating between legitimate
and illegitimate requests for stocklists.
175. See Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 75 (Rule 14a-7 should be
amended to provide shareholders with "quick, cheap, automatic access to the stocklist without
the need for a court fight.").
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unjustifiable demands for stocklists. The next section addresses the question of
how to reform the existing laws to reconcile shareholders' desire to obtain
information with the need to safeguard corporations against improper demands.
V. EVALUATING POLICY ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING
INSPECTION STATUTES
This article argues that the Delaware inspection statute, or federal Rule
14a-7, should be modified to provide shareholders with faster and cheaper
access to information that they need to monitor corporate managers and to
communicate amongst themselves. 176 Any such reforms, however, would need
to protect the corporation's sensitive business information and trade secrets and
to prevent harassment of the corporation by dissident shareholders.17 7 This
section analyzes three possible types of reforms before setting forth the author's
proposals.
A. Expedited Court Proceedings
Virtually every major state's corporate codes provide for an expedited
review of a corporation's rejection of a shareholder's inspection request.1 78 The
expedited hearing procedure is intended to safeguard a shareholder's inspection
right, while providing management a reasonable opportunity to object to
176. Several commentators have offered suggestions about how to revise inspection
statutes so that they better accomplish their purpose. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr & Terrance E.
Schmidt, Inspection Rights of Corporate Stockholders: Toward a More Effective Statutory
Model, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 173, 189 (1974); Watson, supra note 110, at 1296; Young, supra
note 14, at 877.
Starr and Schmidt argue for a non-penalty inspection scheme with four characteristics:
(1) the establishment of a reasonable time period during which management can consider the
request for inspection; (2) a provision that provides for expedited court proceedings on
management's refusal to permit inspection; (3) the allowance of reasonable attorneys' fees to
shareholders with a proper purpose who are forced into judicial proceedings to enforce their
rights; and (4) the elimination of the corporation as a defendant in inspection suits, while
providing corporate indemnification to officers who deny a proper inspection request in good
faith. Starr & Schmidt, supra, at 184. Watson's proposal for improving shareholder access to
the share register suggests the following modifications for respective state statutes: (1)
repudiating management's improper purpose defense; (2) requiring management to supply a
completed copy of the list and updates upon the request of a shareholder; and (3) establishing an
effective remedy for wrongful refusals. Watson would institute a comprehensive summary trial
and appeal scheme, supplemented by the award of attorneys' fees and a substantial statutory
penalty. Watson, supra note 110, at 1300-01. Appellate procedures would either grant corporate
inspectiop demands priority on appeal or make the issuance of a stay discretionary, with a
presumption against issuance. Id. at 1300-01.
Young maintains that the Delaware statute reflects a clear bias toward management in that
only record holders of stock are allowed to inspect, management is not penalized for wrongfully
denying a demand for inspection, and it is tolerant of attempts by management to limit
stockholders from exercising their inspection rights. Young argues that the Delaware courts will
more often than not exercise their discretion in favor of management. Young, supra note 14, at
867-68. Young proposes that an approach like that of the Model Business Corporation Act
should be implemented. Id. at 867-68.
177. In particular, the historical experiences of the 1930's recounted in § 220 suggest that
giving shareholders an absolute right to all corporate information is a mistake. For example, the
corporation's interests in preserving trade secrets and other valuable information from disclosure
to competitors suggest that some mechanism must be incorporated to stop rogue shareholders
from blackmailing and harassing the company.
178. See Randall S. Thomas & Catherine Dixon, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control
(forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at Chapter 3, on file with author).
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unwarranted requests. 79 However, in numerous instances, managers have
delayed the production of stocklists and books and records, forcing
shareholders to make important decisions without the benefit of these
documents. 80
Critics of summary hearing procedures, such as section 220, argue that
they give management an incentive to refuse legitimate requests for inspection
for two reasons. First, management can delay the stockholder from obtaining
the information requested by forcing them commence litigation.181 Second, if
the shareholder knows it will need to bring suit, it may be deterred from
seeking the documents by the significant expenses in this litigation. 8 2
Furthermore, although statutes that expedite procedures reduce the time for a
trial, some of these statutes still permit the defendant to delay the enforcement
of the trial court's order pending an appeal. 83
Delaware's courts expedite the treatment of cases filed under the
inspection statute, particularly stocklist cases. However, as shown in Tables 1
and 3, these summary proceedings still delay the successful plaintiff for a
lengthy period of time. The shareholders must also incur significant attorneys'
fees in pursuing this litigation. This empirical evidence supports critics' claims
that, even with expedited proceedings, management's refusal to provide
information causes the shareholder substantial delay and expense.
A statutory scheme that provides for expedited hearings should minimize
the delay and expense incurred by shareholders with meritorious inspection
requests. Appellate courts should deny a stay pending appeal, or at least make
the issuance of a stay discretionary so that frivolous appeals will not deny
shareholders an effective remedy. This is particularly important for requests
where time is of the essence, such as a request for a stocklist in a proxy contest,
or in a solicitation in opposition to a management proposal. In these situations,
a court must provide relief within a few weeks for it to be effective.
B. Bad Faith Refusals: Deterrence or Compensation?
Expedited hearing procedures alone will not stop companies from
forcing shareholders to obtain a court order if they wish to inspect corporate
documents. Corporate management can benefit from the delay resulting from
the hearing (and possible appeals) if there are no adverse consequences
stemming from an improper refusal to provide shareholders with the requested
information. States have responded in different ways to this problem. Several
states have enacted compensatory statutory provisions that assess attorneys' fees
against the corporation for a bad faith refusal to permit a shareholder to inspect
corporate records.'84 Some other states have enacted deterrent-type statutes
179. Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 186.
180. For a partial list of these cases, see Black, Next Steps, supra note 19, at 31-32;
Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 68-69.
181. Watson, supra note 110, at 1294.
182. Id.
183. Id. Compare E.L. Bruce Co. v. State, 144 A.2d 533 (Del. 1958) (stay pending
appeal in a stocklist case should be denied); Odysey Partners v. Trans World Corp., No. 7125,
slip op. at 6-7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 29, 1983) (same).
184. Under the MBCA, the court may order the corporation to pay the plaintiffs costs,
including attorneys' fees, unless the corporation can prove that it acted reasonably. MBCA §
16.04(c).
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with penalties that are imposed on individual corporate officers for any
refusal.185 California has given five percent shareholders, or one percent
shareholders soliciting proxies under the federal proxy rules, the right to obtain
an order postponing any shareholders' meeting previously noticed for a period
of time equal to the number of days that the company delays in producing the
stocklist.186
Deterrent statutes provide shareholders with an absolute right to inspect
and assess penalties to stop corporations from improperly refusing shareholder
inspection requests. 87 However, the statutory penalties should not be so
onerous that they inhibit a corporate official from denying bad faith
requests. 88
The courts have historically been reluctant to enforce penalty statutes
unless the corporation's refusal to provide the information was in bad faith. t8 9
Furthermore, courts have refused to enforce penalty statutes where the
shareholder seeking inspection has stated an improper purpose, even where the
language of the statutes would appear to give shareholders an absolute right to
inspection. 90
Some penalty statutes provide that the corporation must pay the
shareholders' attorneys' fees where the corporation's refusal to permit
inspection is made in bad faith. These statutes are intended to compensate the
plaintiff for the expenses they incurred in enforcing their rights. This type of
statute has the advantage of tying the dollar amount assessed against the
corporation to the out-of-pocket costs incurred by the shareholder. Although
the Delaware inspection statute does not include such a provision, a recent
Chancery Court decision suggests that Delaware is moving toward granting
attorney fee awards for bad faith refusals. 191
The problem with the compensatory standard is that in many situations,
such as when a shareholder vote is going to be held and timely access to the
stocklist is crucial, the assessment of a relatively small amount of attorney fees
will not deter a corporation from acting in bad faith to deny inspection.
Furthermore, if the shareholder bears the burden of proving that the
corporation's refusal was in bad-faith, it will be difficult for the shareholder to
recover its expenses.
A well-drafted statute should function to deter wrongful refusals and to
compensate shareholders who incur needless expense in litigation. One potential
185. Id. §16.04. See also Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 176-77.
186. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600 (West 1995).
187. Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 177-78. One commentator has argued that an
award of attorneys' fees and payment of a fixed statutory penalty against individual officers and
directors while prohibiting indemnification by the corporation may solve this problem. Watson,
supra note 110, at 1302. If this award of attorneys' fees falls below the amount necessary for
deterrent purposes, a fixed penalty could be added to it.
188. Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 177-78; MBCA § 16.02, Offical Commentary,
at 1725.
189. Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 177 (citing cases). Mandatory penalties were
found to be unsatisfactory because they exposed corporate officers to potentially extensive
personal liability if they denied the request of a shareholder whose intent was to harm the
corporation.
190. Id.
191. Ostgrow v. Bonney Forge Corp., No. 13270, 1994 WL 114807, at *13 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 6, 1994).
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solution is to allow the shareholder to sue the corporate officer responsible for
denying the inspection request in his individual capacity and to forbid corporate
indemnification for an officer's bad faith refusal. 192 However, as noted above,
corporate officers may grant undesirable applications if they face a threat of
personal liability.
If the corporation alone is the defendant, then the penalties assessed
would have to be very substantial to achieve effective deterrence. The
shareholder would need complete relief, not just payment of attorneys' fees, to
obtain adequate compensation. In a proxy contest, or other shareholder
solicitation, this could require a court order postponing the shareholder vote
until the court-ordered information was provided and the shareholder had
sufficient time to use it effectively. 193
C. Eliminating the Improper Purpose Defense
The corporation's traditional defense to a shareholder's inspection
demand is that the shareholder has failed to state a proper purpose. 194 To state a
proper purpose, a shareholder must claim that it wishes to examine the
corporate information for a reason that relates to its investment in the
corporation. The courts have tried to interpret the proper purpose requirement
to balance the requesting stockholder's interest in obtaining information against
the corporation's interest in protecting itself and other shareholders from
harmful or disruptive inspections.195
When the corporation raises the defense that the shareholder has failed to
state a proper purpose, it can force a trial (and in many states, if it loses at trial,
an appeal) on the issue, thereby delaying the production of the stocklist.196 At
trial, in a Delaware proceeding to obtain a stocklist, the corporation has the
burden of showing the shareholder's purpose is wrongful or improper. 197 By
contrast, the shareholder has the burden of proving a proper purpose as to all
books and records other than the stocklist. 98
Should the improper purpose defense be eliminated? The case for
abolition is strongest where a stockholder is demanding a stocklist. In a stocklist
case, the "proprietary" information that management seeks to protect through
the assertion of the proper purpose defense is nothing more than the names and
addresses of the record holders of its stock. Shareholders who do not wish to
have this information made available can choose to hold their shares through a
bank or broker, that is in "street" name, and thus avoid direct contact with a
soliciting shareholder. 199
192. See Starr & Schmidt, supra note 176, at 188; Watson, supra note 110, at 1301.
193. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600 (providing for delay in holding any stockholder
meeting where the corporation has delayed production of a stocklist to a five percent stockholder
or a one percent stockholder that is engaged in a solicitation).
194. See 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.7.
195. Young, supra note 14, at 856.
196. Watson, supra note 110, at 1290.
197. It is not enough for the corporation to show that the stockholder has an improper
secondary purpose if the stockholder has a proper primary purpose. 2 FOLK E" AL., supra note
15, § 220.7. This burden-shifting does not, however, obviate the necessity for non-management
shareholders, in requesting a list, to satisfy the statutory requirements.
198. 2 FOLK ET AL., supra note 15, § 220.7.5.
199. See Thomas & Dixon, supra note 178 (manuscript at Chapter 5). Shareholders that
do not wish to have their identities known have a variety of options to conceal them.
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The potential abuse of this right by direct mail solicitors, or "crank"
shareholders, could be remedied in a variety of ways.200 Perhaps the most
expedient and complete solution would be to establish a standard agreement
about the production of the stocklist, limiting its use to communication with
other shareholders about corporate matters, or the solicitation of proxies.20'
Shareholders would agree to abide by these restrictions and post a bond to
insure their compliance.202 Corporations could file suit if a violation occurred
and ask that the offender be fined and barred from obtaining any other stocklist
for a number of years.
All of these arguments support eliminating the proper purpose
requirement and automatically granting shareholders access to stocklists. This is
especially true for institutional shareholders that are not involved in control
contests and for shareholder solicitations in opposition to management
solicitations. In these instances, shareholders should be entitled to immediate
and unencumbered access to the shareholder list.203
The justification for the proper purpose requirement is stronger where a
court is protecting sensitive corporate information whose release might
competitively disadvantage the corporation. Even here though, the proper
purpose requirement's utility is limited. A shareholder need only to carry its
burden of stating a valid primary purpose-the corporation cannot defeat the
demand simply by showing an invalid secondary purpose. 204 A well-advised
shareholder generally should be able to state a valid purpose for obtaining
many types of books and records.205
The second argument for eliminating the proper purpose requirement
even for books and records is that for most types of information that
shareholders interested in monitoring management would want, confidentiality
restrictions backed by financial requirements are adequate to protect the
corporation's interest in its business information. For example, where
shareholders are concerned about management fraud or wrongdoing, details of
internal investigations by attorneys and accountants should be made available to
the shareholders without protracted litigation, subject to confidentiality
Shareholders who hold their stock through a bank or broker will not have their names on the
company's list of recordholders. If the company attempts to learn this information through Rules
14b-1 or 14b-2, the stockholder can object to this disclosure and remain anonymous. For a
more complete discussion of this question, see id.
200. Some inspection statutes attempt to limit harassment by requiring that shareholders
own a minimum of five percent of the companies' stock or have owned the companies' stock for
a minimum of six months. See Young, supra note 14, at 852-53.
201. Courts have the power to place reasonable limitations and restrictions on the
stockholder's use and dissemination of information gained in the course of examination toprotect the corporation from potential harm. MBCA § 16.04(d); see Young, supra note 14, at
851 n.41. If they sought the stocklist for other reasons, shareholders would need to make
application to the court.
202. The amount of the bond should be sufficient to cover the corporation's costs of filing
suit if a violation occurred.
203. Cf. Black, Next Steps, supra note 19, at 33 (SEC should consider further revisions
of Rule 14a-7 to provide shareholders access to stocklist for a solicitation in opposition to a
management proposal).
204. 2 FOLK Er AL., supra note 15, § 220.7.3.
205. However, even where the shareholder states a proper purpose, the Delaware courts
will protect the corporation's sensitive business information from discovery by restricting the
information produced to those documents that "essential and sufficient" to achieving the
shareholder's stated purpose. See id. § 220.5 for a discussion of this requirement.
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agreements. Institutional investors that are actively monitoring their long term
investments in the corporation will almost certainly abide by such agreements.
Undoubtedly, there are limitations on the use of confidentiality
agreements. Proprietary business information, such as secret production
processes or customer lists, cannot be adequately safeguarded with
confidentiality agreements without onerous bond requirements. Furthermore,
requests by certain types of shareholders, particularly those actively seeking
control of the corporation, should be subjected to judicial scrutiny before any
information is produced.20 6
VI. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Shareholders' inspection rights are fundamental to their ability to
monitor effectively corporate management in situations where management
tries to block shareholders from obtaining information about the corporation.
In times of crisis, inspection statutes that give management too much control
over information may be misused. At the same time, corporate managers are
well-positioned to stop abuses of shareholder inspection rights by opportunistic
competitors or corporate gadflies.
This conflict can be minimized by two revisions in inspection statutes:
automatic access to information for certain types of shareholders, and further
streamlining the existing inspection process for all other requests. Inspection
statutes should provide for automatic access to the corporation's stocklist and
limited types of nonsensitive corporate books and records, for certain classes of
shareholders, such as long term institutional shareholders, where the dangers to
corporate policy are minimal, and for all shareholder demands related to
communicating about pending shareholder votes, where any harm to the
corporation is far outweighed by the benefits of informing shareholders.
The dual objectives of informed shareholder voting, and equal access for
both management and shareholders that are soliciting voters, 207 lead to the
conclusion that stocklists should be made available whenever a shareholder vote
is pending, either as part of a proxy contest, or as a countersolicitation in
opposition to a management proposal. In fact, a strong argument can be made
that shareholders should have an absolute right to the corporation's stocklist in
all circumstances. The corporation's interests in protecting its shareholders
from harassment by maintaining shareholders' privacy are adequately served by
requiring any shareholder requesting the stocklist to execute appropriate
confidentiality agreements with adequate bond provisions.20 8
Large institutional investors that are actively monitoring corporate
management should be provided with immediate access to most corporate books
and records provided that they agree to execute confidentiality agreements and
post an appropriate bond. The statute must be carefully drafted to protect the
206. See Thomas S. Betts Corp. v. Leviton Mfg. Co., Inc., 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS (Dec.
19, 1995) (denying those portions of a shareholder's books and records request that related to its
interest in acquiring the company in a hostile transaction).
207. See Black, Disclosure, Not Censorship, supra note 3, at 67.
208. Shareholders that are particularly sensitive about having other shareholders learn their
identities can still keep this information secret by holding their stock in street name and refusing
to consent to disclosure of their identities under Rules 14b-I and 14b-2. See Thomas & Dixon,
supra note 178 (manuscript at Chapter 5).
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corporation against the shareholder's misuse of the corporation's proprietary
secrets. First of all, only shareholders that are not seeking control, 209 nor
actively competing with the corporation, nor involved in labor negotiations
with the corporation, 210 should benefit from an automatic access rule for books
and records. These restrictions would reduce the risk of shareholder misuse of
corporate documents. Furthermore, trade secrets and other confidential
business information should not generally be provided to shareholders. As
noted above, confidentiality agreements may not provide sufficient protection
for the corporation with respect to these materials.
For the remaining demands, inspection statutes should be revised to
streamline shareholder access to information and deter frivolous refusals. These
revisions could take three forms: shortening the time required to complete an
inspection case; reducing the cost to the plaintiff of fighting these cases; and
increasing the plaintiff's likelihood of success.
The time it takes to handle an inspection case could be shortened in
several ways. One possibility is to eliminate a stay pending appeal. This would
mean that if the corporation loses in the trial court, it cannot delay execution of
the court's order by seeking appellate review. This would make the most sense
for stocklist cases, where the potential harm to the corporation from an
incorrect trial court decision is limited. In books and records cases, the stay
could be discretionary but with a substantial bond required so that an appellate
court might in an important case weigh the possible harm to the corporation
from the disclosure of the information before determining whether to permit
immediate examination.
The time and the cost of inspection cases could be reduced by further
limiting the issues and the discovery process in inspection cases. Most
importantly, the proper purpose requirement could be eliminated for stocklist
cases and most types of books and records cases. A standard confidentiality
agreement that would cover most contingencies could be generated for use in
stocklist cases. This could be coupled with a bond requirement in an amount
sufficient to deter abuses.
Plaintiffs' expected costs for inspection cases could be lowered by
insuring that they are compensated if the corporation's refusal is frivolous.211
The key is that the court award the shareholders complete relief, not just the
amount of their attorneys' fees. Complete relief may require the court to order
a delay in the corporate vote so the shareholders will have enough time to use
the information they obtain from their inspection demand.212 Adopting such a
209. Thus, for example, if a shareholder had filed a Schedule 13D stating that they
intended to try to gain control of the target company, it would be barred from obtaining its books
and records in this manner.
210. These institutions may have interests that are at odds with those of other investors
because they have dual interests as both capital and labor. For a further discussion of these
issues, see Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth Martin, An Empirical Analysis of Labor Unions' Use
of the Shareholder Proposal Rule (Unpublished Working Paper, University of Iowa College of
Law 1996) (copy on file with author).
211. The more likely the court is to grant reimbursement, the lower the plaintiff's expected
costs. At a very simple level, the plaintiffs expected costs of filing a lawsuit are the out-of-
pocket cost of the suit times the probability of being reimbursed for these costs. For example, if
the cost of the inspection case is $20,000, and the probability of being reimbursed is 50%, then
the plaintiff's expected cost is $10,000.
212. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1600.
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policy would also deter wrongful refusals because corporations would know
that delay would be of little or no benefit to them.
Finally, the inspection statutes could be revised to improve the plaintiff's
likelihood of success. The Delaware statute already shifts the burden of proof
onto the defendant corporation in stocklist cases to show that the plaintiff has
not established a proper purpose. This shifting of the burden of proof could be
extended to books and records cases in instances where the information sought
is neither trade secrets nor other sensitive proprietary data. Furthermore, the
other changes outlined above would increase the likelihood that shareholders
will succeed in their inspection demands. These proposals would also lower the
costs of, and time taken, resolving an inspection case.
Delaware should revise its inspection statute to provide shareholders with
faster and cheaper statutory access to stocklists and books and records. The
policy recommendations in this article are incremental ones, intended to
preserve needed protections for the corporation's interests and deter abuses by
destructive shareholders. At the same time, Delaware corporations could
benefit from encouraging shareholder monitoring. One small step in that
direction is to provide shareholders access to the data that they need to become
better monitors of corporate management. If Delaware is unwilling to make
these changes, then shareholders should ask the SEC to reopen the issue of
revising Rule 14a-7 to provide shareholders with better access to the
information that they need to monitor corporate management.
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